BOEMRE Releases Final Report On Transocean Deepwater Horizon Blowout

September 14th,2011-The newly created Bureau Of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) released the results of a 17 month investigation into BP's Transocean Deepwater Horizon Blowout. (Read Entire BOEMRE Report Below)

The long-awaited report concludes the loss of life at the Macondo site on April 20, 2010, and the subsequent pollution of the Gulf of Mexico through the summer of 2010 were the result of poor risk management, last‐minute changes to plans, failure to observe and respond to critical indicators, inadequate well control response, and insufficient emergency bridge response training by companies and individuals responsible for drilling at the Macondo well and for the operation of the Deepwater Horizon.

The Panel found that a central cause of the blowout was failure of a cement barrier in the production casing string, a high‐strength steel pipe set in a well to ensure well integrity and to allow future production. The failure of the cement barrier allowed hydrocarbons to flow up the wellbore, through the riser and onto the rig, resulting in the blowout. The precise reasons for the failure of the production casing cement job are not known. The Panel concluded that the failure was likely due to:

(1) swapping of cement and drilling mud (referred to as “fluid inversion”) in the shoe track (the section of casing near the bottom of the well);

(2) contamination of the shoe track cement; or

(3) pumping the cement past the target location in the well, leaving the shoe track with little or no cement (referred to as “over‐displacement”).

BP, as the designated operator under BOEMRE regulations, was ultimately responsible for conducting operations at Macondo in a way that ensured the safety and protection of personnel, equipment, natural resources, and the environment. Transocean, the owner of the Deepwater Horizon, was
responsible for conducting safe operations and for protecting personnel onboard. Halliburton, as a contractor to BP, was responsible for conducting the cement job, and, through its subsidiary (Sperry Sun), had certain responsibilities for monitoring the well. Cameron was responsible for the design of the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer (“BOP”) stack.

At the time of the blowout, the rig crew was engaged in “temporary abandonment” activities to secure the well after drilling was completed and before the Deepwater Horizon left the site. In the days leading up to April 20, BP made a series of decisions that complicated cementing operations, added
incremental risk, and may have contributed to the ultimate failure of the cement job.

These decisions included:

• The use of only one cement barrier. BP did not set any additional cement or mechanical barriers in the well, even though various well conditions created difficulties for the production casing cement job.

• The location of the production casing. BP decided to set production casing ina location in the well that created additional risk of hydrocarbon influx.

• The decision to install a lock‐down sleeve. BP’s decision to include the setting of a lock‐down sleeve (a piece of equipment that connects and holds the production casing to the wellhead during production) as part of the temporary abandonment procedure at Macondo increased the risks associated with subsequent operations, including the displacement of mud, the negative test sequence and the setting of the surface plug.

• The production casing cement job. BP failed to perform the production casing cement job in accordance with industry‐accepted recommendations.

The Panel concluded that BP failed to communicate these decisions and the increasing operational risks to Transocean. As a result, BP and Transocean personnel onboard the Deepwater Horizon did not fully identify and evaluate the risks inherent in the operations that were being conducted at Macondo.

The report finds that the rig crew of Deepwater Horizon failed to properly interpret the results of the negative test on the production casing instead explaining the differential pressure away as the result of a "bladder effect" which later proved deadly.

Crew members failed to recognize a number of additional signs that the well was kicking until 9:42 PM when the well was blowing drilling mud into the derrick and on the rig floor. The report states that if members of the rig crew had detected the hydrocarbon influx earlier, they might have been able to take appropriate actions to control the well.

Fault finding

• The report claims the same rig crew had failed to detect a kick on a previous occasion in March for 30 minutes
• The rig crew bypassed a critical flow meter while failing to monitor additional flow meters that would have indicated a kick
• Simultaneous rig operations hampered the rig crew’s well monitoring abilities.
  The rig crew’s decision to conduct simultaneous operations during the
  critical negative tests ‐ including displacement of fluids to two active mud
  pits and cleaning the pits in preparation to move the rig ‐ complicated
  well‐monitoring efforts.

Everyone on board the Deepwater Horizon was obligated to follow the
Transocean “stop work” policy that was in place which provided that

“each employee has the obligation to interrupt an operation to prevent an
incident from occurring.”

Despite the fact that the Panel identified a number of reasons that the rig crew could have invoked stop work authority, no individual on the Deepwater Horizon did so on April 20.

 

The Panel found evidence that BP and, in some instances, its contractors
violated the several federal regulations which endangered the crew and led to the loss of life. (these are detailed in the report which can be downloaded here)

The 217 page report concludes the Macondo well blowout was the result of a series of decisions that increased risk and a number of actions that failed to fully consider or mitigate those risks. While it is not possible to discern which precise combination of these decisions and actions set the blowout in motion, it is clear that increased vigilance and awareness by BP, Transocean and Halliburton personnel at critical junctures during operations at the macondo well would have reduced the likelihood of the blowout occurring.

 

Below you can view the entire BOEMRE Macondo Blowout report

DOWNLOAD BOEMRE DEEPWATER HORIZON REPORT HERE