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Drilling Ahead

World Oilfield Forum

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Explosion-A Discussion of What Actually Happened?

 I will start the discussion with this which came in email a moment ago...

Anybody with any thoughts?


April 26, 2010       Transocean
Rig Disaster: The Well From Hell

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more. Here's another update on the disaster that befell Transocean Ltd. and BP last week in the Gulf of Mexico.
(Thanks to OI reader Steve, in Texas, for sending some of the photos in today’s alert.)

As you know by now, the drilling vessel Deepwater Horizon exploded, burned and sank last week, with the loss of 11 workers and injuries to many more. What happened? What's happening now? What's going to happen? I've spent the weekend working to piece things together.

An Ill-fated Discovery
According to news accounts, at about 10 p.m. CDT last Tuesday, Deepwater Horizon was stable, holding an exact position in calm, dark seas about 45 miles south of the Louisiana coastline. Water depth in the area is 5,000 feet. The vessel manifest listed 126 souls on board.

Deepwater Horizon was finishing work on an exploration well named Macondo, in an area called Mississippi Canyon Block 252. After weeks of drilling, the rig had pushed a bit down over 18,000 feet, into an oil-bearing zone. The Transocean and BP personnel were installing casing in the well. BP was going to seal things up, and then go off and figure out how to produce the oil -- another step entirely in the oil biz.

The Macondo Block 252 reservoir may hold as much as 100 million barrels. That's not as large as other recent oil strikes in the Gulf, but BP management was still pleased. Success is success --
certainly in the risky, deep-water oil environment. The front office of BP Exploration was preparing a press release to announce a "commercial" oil discovery.

This kind of exploration success was par for the course for Deepwater Horizon. A year ago, the vessel set a record at another site in the Gulf, drilling a well just over 35,000 feet and discovering the 3 billion barrel Tiber deposit for BP. SoDeepwater Horizon was a great rig, with a great crew and a superb record. You might even say that is was lucky.

But perhaps some things tempt the Gods. Some actions may invite ill fate. Because suddenly, the wild and wasteful ocean struck with a bolt from the deep.

The Lights Went out;
and Then.
.. 

Witnesses state that the lights flickered on the Deepwater Horizon. Then a massive thud shook the vessel, followed by another strong vibration. Transocean employee Jim Ingram, a seasoned
offshore worker, told the U.K. Times that he was preparing for bed after working a 12-hour shift. "On the second [thud]," said Mr. Ingram, "we knew something was wrong." Indeed, something was very wrong.

Within a moment, a gigantic blast of gas, oil and drilling mud roared up through three miles of down-hole pipe and subsea risers. The fluids burst through the rig floor and ripped up into the gigantic draw-works. Something sparked. The hydrocarbons ignited. In a fraction of a second, the drilling deck of the Deepwater Horizon exploded into a fireball. The scene was an utter conflagration.

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Listing

Evacuate and Abandon
Ship 


There was almost no time to react. Emergency beacons blared. Battery-powered lighting switched on throughout the vessel. Crew members ran to evacuation stations. The order came to abandon ship.
Then from the worst of circumstances came the finest, noblest elements of human behavior. Everyone on the vessel has been through extensive safety training. They knew what to do. Most crew members climbed into covered lifeboats. Other crew members quickly winched the boats, with their shipmates, down to the water. Then those who stayed behind rapidly evacuated in other designated emergency craft.

Some of the crew, however, were trapped in odd parts of the massive vessel, which measures 396 feet by 256 feet -- a bit less than the size of two football fields laid side by side.( This is one big
Drill Ship) They couldn't get to the boats. So they did what they had to do, which for some meant jumping -- and those jumpers did not fare so well. Several men broke bones due to the impact of their 80-foot drop to the sea. Still, it beat burning.

With searchlights providing illumination, as well as the eerie light from the flames of the raging fire, boat handlers pulled colleagues out of the water beneath the burning rig. In some instances, the plastic fittings on the lifeboats melted from the heat.

The flames intensified.
Soon it was impossible for the lifeboats to function near the massive vessel. The small boats moved away from the raging fountain of fire fed by ancient oil and gas from far below.

Transocean Horizon Burning At Night

The lifeboat skippers saved as many as they could find -- 115 -- but couldn't account for 11 workers who were, apparently, on or around the drill deck at the time of the first explosion. Nine of the missing are Transocean employees. Two others work for subcontractors.

Damon
Bankston to the Rescue 


Fate was not entirely cruel that night. Indeed, a supply boat was already en route to the Deepwater
Horizon. It was the Tidewater Damon Bankston, a 260-foot long flat-deck supply vessel.

Damon Bankston heard the distress signal. Her captain did what great captains do. He aimed the bow toward the position of Deepwater Horizon. Then he tore through the water, moved along by four mighty Caterpillar engines rated at 10,200 horsepower. Soon, the Damon Bankston arrived on scene,
sailed straight into the flames and joined the rescue.

Meanwhile, Coast Guard helicopters lifted off from pads in southern Louisiana, and Coast Guard
rescue vessels left their moorings. "You have to go out," is the old Coast Guard saying. "You don't have to come back."

The helicopters flew in the black of night toward a vista of utter disaster. Arriving on scene, the pilots watched in awe as columns of flame shot as high as a 50-story building. The helicopters were buffeted by blasts of super-heated wind coming from the flames, while chunks of soot the size of your hand blew by.

The pilots hovered in the glow of the blazing rig, while Coast Guard medics fast-roped down to the deck of Damon Bankston . The medics quickly assessed the casualties, strapped critically injured crewmen to backboards and hoisted them up to the helicopters. Then the pilots turned north and sped ashore to hospitals.

Uninjured survivors returned to land on the Damon Bankston. And others came out to fight
the blistering flames.

But the Deepwater Horizon wasn't going to make it. The situation deteriorated, to the point of complete catastrophe. The ship was lost.

Transocean Horizon On Fire Sinking

At about 10 a.m. CDT on Thursday morning, 36 hours after the first explosion, the Deepwater Horizon capsized and sank in 5,000 feet of water. According to BP, the hulk is located on the
seafloor, upside-down, about 1,500 feet away from the Macondo well it drilled.

Still Spilling Oil 
On Friday, I told you that the oil well drilled by the Deepwater Horizon was sealed in. The "official" word was that the well wasn't gushing oil into the sea. My sources were no less than U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry, of the New Orleans district, as quoted in The New York Times. 

But over the weekend, Rear Adm. Landry and The New York Times reported that the well IS leaking oil, at a rate of about 1,000 barrels per day.

The on-scene information comes from remotely operated underwater robots that BP and Transocean are using to monitor the well and survey all the other wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon. There's now a large amount of equipment and pipe and a myriad of marine debris on the seafloor near the well. It's a mess.

Apparently, the blowout preventer is not controlling the flow of oil. According to Transocean, the blowout preventer on Deepwater Horizon was manufactured by Cameron Intl. (CAM: NYSE). 

What happened? We don't know that just yet. Earlier reports that underwater robots sealed the blowout preventer were wrong. It's possible that the blowout preventer is only partially closed. We'll find out, eventually. Meanwhile, BP and Transocean have announced that they will make another effort to activate the blowout preventer. They need to stop that oil.

BP is also preparing to drill one or more relief wells to secure the site permanently. BP has mobilized the drilling rig Development Driller III, which is moving into position to drill a second well to intercept the leaking well. With the new well, the drillers will inject a specialized heavy fluid into the original well. This fluid will secure and block the flow of oil or gas and allow BP to permanently seal the first well.

Riser Problems? 

According to the Coast Guard and BP, oil is leaking from two spots along what is left of the riser system. Here's a schematic view:

Transocean Horizon Sea Floor Diagram

Originally, the risers (represented by the blue line in the graphic above) were affixed to the blowout preventer on the seafloor, and extended 5,000 feet straight up to the "moon pool" of the Deepwater Horizon. When the drilling vessel sank, it took the riser piping and bent it around like a pretzel.

The remnants of the riser system now follow a circuitous underwater route. According to BP, the risers extend from the wellhead up through the water column to about 1,500 feet above the seabed.
Then the riser system buckles back down toward the seafloor. (Frankly, I'm astonished that it all held together as well as it has. It's a credit to the manufacturer, which I'll discuss below.)

According to the Transocean website, the riser devices on the Deepwater Horizonwere manufactured by VetcoGray, a division of General Electric Oil & Gas. The specific designation is a "HMF-Class H, 21-inch outside diameter riser; 90 foot long joints with Choke & Kill, and booster and hydraulic  supply lines."

Here's a photo of something similar. These are Vetco risers sections that I saw on another vessel, the Transocean Discoverer Inspiration, when I visited that ship last month:

Transocean Horizon Riser Sections

The different color stripes on the risers indicate differing amounts of buoyancy. The idea is to put heavy riser pipe down at the bottom, connected to more buoyant risers above. The buoyancy
keeps the entire riser system in more or less neutral buoyancy, so that the drill ship doesn't have to somehow hoist up the huge weight of all that pipe.

As you can see, there's a large-diameter pipe in the middle of each riser. That pipe is then encased in a buoyant foam substance. The risers are bolted together at the flange sections. The bolts are about as big as the arm of a very strong man. The nuts, which tighten things down, are the size of paint cans.

After the risers are assembled and hanging down from the drilling vessel, the drilling personnel lower and raise drilling pipe through the large-diameter center riser pipe. All the drilling mud stays inside the drill pipe on the way down hole, and inside the riser pipe on the return.

On the side of the riser sections, you can see smaller-diameter pipes. These are choke & kill, booster and hydraulic pipe components. The pipes run parallel to the large-diameter inner pipe. These pipe systems run down to the blowout preventer on the seafloor.

The idea is to keep the drilling process an enclosed system. All the "drilling stuff" -- the drill-pipe, drilling-mud and drill-cutting returns -- stays inside the large-diameter pipe. The smaller pipes
hold fluid to transmit hydraulic power and help control drilling. In particular, the pipes on the side aid in communicating with and controlling the blowout preventer.

Technical Specs 

Ideally, when the risers are working as intended, nothing leaks out into the sea. Then again, you're not supposed to twist and bend the riser sections like a pretzel. So how strong is a riser
system? Extremely strong, actually.

According to technical literature from GE Oil & Gas, the riser equipment is "designed for use in
high-pressure, critical service and deep-water drilling and production applications." The pressure-containing components are rated for working pressures of 15,000 psi. That's the same as the Cameron blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon. The materials used in risers have
exceptional tensile and bending load characteristics.

According to Vetco paperwork that I've seen, the Class H riser sections have a 3.5 million pound
load-carrying capacity. That's the equivalent weight of about four fully fueled
Boeing 747s. These risers are super strong.

Still, it's not just any one single piece of riser section that does it all. These sections all get bolted
together, for 5,000 feet in this case. The riser sections all have to work together as a system. The whole string is only as strong as the weakest spot. And yes, even the strongest steel will break if you apply enough stress.

It all has to work together. You've got the riser sections, along with things called HMF flanged riser connectors. Then there are HMF riser joints; flex joints; telescopic joints; and, near the top, things called "fluid-bearing, nonintegral tensioner rings." Together, these all comprise the marine riser system.

In general, the riser components compensate for heave, surge, sway, offset and torque of the drilling vessel as the ship bounces around on the sea surface. The bottom line is to maintain a tight seal -- what's called "integrity" -- between the subsea blowout preventer stack and the surface
during drilling operations.

Down at the bottom, at the seafloor, the risers are connected to the blowout preventer by a connector device. The GE-Vetco spec is for a device that accommodates 7 million foot-pounds of bending
load capacity. That's about eight fully fueled Boeing 747s.

What's the idea? You want a secure connection between the high-pressure wellhead system and
the subsea blowout preventer stack. That's where mankind's best steel meets Mother Nature's high pressures.

High pressures? You had better believe it. And in this case, Mother Nature won. So looking forward, there's going to be a lot of forensic engineering on the well design and how things got monitored
during drilling. Transocean drilled the well, but BP designed it. So the key question is how did the down-hole pressures get away like they did?

What Happens
Now? 


It's a good thing that the Deepwater Horizon didn't settle right on top of the well. At least there's room for the remotely operated vehicles to maneuver. Also, there's still a lot of riser still floating in the water column. So there's some element of integrity going down to the blowout preventer.

It's absolutely imperative to shut off that oil flow. We just have to hope and pray that the BP and Transocean people can get the blowout preventer shut off. Or that there's enough integrity to the risers somehow to get in there and control the leaks, perhaps with some sort of plug. One other idea is to lower a large "hood" over the leak and capture the oil so it can be pumped up to a storage tanker ship.

Meanwhile, the relief well has to go down -- carefully and safely. This Macondo well is history. Seal it. Mark it. Give it back to the sea. Move on. Don't tempt fate on this
one. And wow... for a relatively modest-sized deep-water discovery, this
thing sure has turned into the well from hell.

Welcome to the World of Deep-water Risk 

As I've said before, this accident is Mother Nature's wake-up call to everyone. Deep-water drilling is a high-stakes game. It's not exactly a "casino," in that there's a heck of a lot of settled science,
engineering and technology involved.  But we're sure finding out the hard way what all the risks are. And it's becoming more and more clear how the totality of risk is a moving target. There's geologic risk, technical risk, engineering risk, environmental risk, capital risk and market risk.


With each deep well, these risks all come together over one very tiny spot at the bottom of the ocean. So for all the oil that's out there under deep water -- and it's a lot -- the long-term calculus of risk and return is difficult to quantify.

There's more to discuss, but I'll end here today. I'll update you as things evolve. This is big news all through the offshore industry. There are HUGE environmental issues, and certainly big political repercussions. I won't go there just now. For now, I'll just send out collective best wishes to the people at Transocean, BP, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management and so many more. I'm sure they're doing their best.

Thanks for reading...

(Name Withheld)

Tags: Transocean, cause, deepwater, discussion, explosion, happened, horizon, what

Views: 10018

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Replies to This Discussion

Can anyone say more about this "bullhead klll" they are also talking about? The NYTimes article in which I noticed the term is not too clear. Which "existing pipes," e.g.?

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/us/18spill.html?ref=global-home


"The technician, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment on the work, said that engineers had discussed stopping work on the relief well in favor of a “bullhead kill.” In that operation, heavy mud would be pumped in through existing pipes and the oil and gas would be forced back into the oil reservoir at the bottom of the well.

"The procedure is somewhat similar to the “top kill” method that failed in early June, but would be much more likely to succeed because with the well sealed, no oil or gas would be moving inside.

A BP spokesman said Saturday that the relief well was still considered the ultimate solution to the leak."
I can answer the "existing pipes" question. When they tried the "top kill" they installed equipment on the sea floor to pump into the well. They used this equipment later to flow oil to the surface & capture it. So the "piping" for the "top kill" is still in place.
I believe this to be another case of someone talking out of their backside. With the well having so many unknowns still, and the relief well with in inches of the MC-252, they would have to be literally insane to even consider bull-heading this well from the top. Good thing he spoke in anonymity, because it would tag him for life as being the biggest idiot in the world for life. Would even doubt, since this shut in has everything so boring, that the NY Times wouldn't manufacture such a stupid statement, just to sell a few birdcage liners. Idiots, the whole lot of them......
The top kill would depend on the ability of the formation to allow fluid to be pushed back into it relatively easy with out additional force. It would be determined by performing an injection test to establish an injection rate and at would pressure it takes to inject. There is still not too much safety margin between CICP and casing burst pressure. If they pump 17 PPG mud from a vessel at the surface by the time the full column of mud is at sea bed they have created an additional pressure inside the well of 4,685 PSI. The casing can not take that much additional pressure without rupturing. Therefore the formation injection test must allow injection at a much lower pressure such as 1000 PSI or at some pressure above CICP but below casing burst pressure. The critical time is when the heavy mud is above the BOP and above the casing. As soon as heavy mud is actually going down the casing the formation pressure being felt at the well head will start to reduce because of the hydrostatic of the heavy mud in the casing. The more feet of heavy mud going down the casing the less formation pressure acting against the casing above the mud. The more mud inside casing the less surface pressure required to inject the mud. The fact is they know the casing 16" casing will hold 14 PPG mud. They finished drilling the well with 14 PPG mud if I remember correctly. The pressure on the upper casing when the well was finished was 3858 PSI from the hydrostatic of the 14 PPG drilling mud. In my opinion the logical thing to do is an injection test using a light fluid either the actual oil being produced or the approx. weight od sea water. This will establish the injection pressure required and the injection rate. If it only takes an additional few hundred PSI to reverse the flow of the well and establish a high injection rate then the Top Kill will work. If they have a very low injection rate then it is possible to damage the casing at sea bed. They could also use a low density fluid first of 9 of 10 PPG and force all the oil and gas back into the formation. This would give additional safety factor at the well head to withstand additional pressure of a heavier kill fluid. If mud can be pushed all the way back to the bottom of the well then 14 PPG will kill the well as long as the column of mud is all the way up the choke line to surface. The reason for the 17 PPG kill mud is the same as figuring for riser margin. That is the mud weight required to hold back formation pressure when the riser is disconnected. 14 PPG mud held the formation back when the column came all the way back to surface. For the mud to hold back the formation pressure with out the riser the mud weight has to be increased inside the well to allow for the loss of hydrostatic between original mud weight in the riser and the sea water between the well head and the surface. This works out to about 3 pounds per gallon. Original mud weight 14, kill mud weight including riser margin 17 PPG.
Tex,

"If they pump 17 PPG mud from a vessel at the surface by the time the full column of mud is at sea bed they have created an additional pressure inside the well of 4,685 PSI."

Wouldn't BP bleed off the gas pressure at the same relative rate that they were pumping in the mud?

And, as the mud fell and occupied the lower regions of the well, wouldn't this insulate the remaining methane from the thermal / pressure effects imparted by the 262' F walls of the casing?

Hypothetically, if they bled off gas pressure, as they pumped in the 17 ppg mud, they could fill the entire column without changing the well head pressure one iota, in fact--it should decrease as the mud displaces the thermal conductivity of the gas to the bore.

I have to agree with "Ace" in that this maneuver should not be attempted...not because it is impossible, rather because the personnel involved in calculations for previous rescue efforts have proven gross incompetence in the line of fire.

Best,
Russell
To do a top kill you can not simply pump in a few barrels and bleed off a few bbls. Fluids will not pass each other in a well bore in that manner. They may call this the engineers method or (the last chance method), with names like top hat and junk shot, they may have another name picked out, but if it can actually be achieved in a well of this depth and other complications involved remains to be seen. You will simply cut the mud weight of the kill mud to the point you have none left. Normally on a top kill what you want to do is bull head the formation fluids back into the formation. There is no way to get good kill mud to the bottom of a 18,000 ft well any other way. In any well kill operation the preferred place to have the drill pipe where the kill mud comes out is below the kick or as close as possible. In this condition you actually remove the gas completely as the kill procedure is taking place. If you try to kill the well above the zone then higher kill mud weights will be required and many more circulations. The result being at some point you have to get to the bottom of the zone and circulate out any remaining gas or contaminated mud. At this point you can call the well dead and clean. There are other things to consider also about this top kill or even a bottom kill through the relief well. Although the kicking zone is most likely one and the same, there may be multiple pathways up the well. We are all sure that the flow is coming up the back of the casing, we are pretty sure there is flow coming inside the casing, there is also flow coming through the remaining drill pipe inside the well, and according to my previous discussions I think the casing may have entered the BOP and then was smashed closed to some degree when the blind shears or pipe rams tried to close. Another thing which may have partially smashed the top of the drill pipe and or casing partially closed is when they use the big shear to cut the riser above the LMRP. The point being that this well will not be dead until all flow paths are either full of kill mud or cement. How ever it is killed from top or bottom, these multiple flow paths are going to complicate it much more then if there were only one flow path. If drill pipe or casing is smashed almost to closure it will be full of gas and oil, but the kill mud will also take the path of least resistance. Example: If the kill mud should follow the path outside the casing then at some point it will start forcing the oil and gas up the casing from the bottom side. As this oil and gas is coming out the top of the casing it will start contaminating and cutting the weight of the kill mud going down the outside of the casing. In a normal well kill you have one path down (Drill Pipe) one path up annulus D.P. x Csg. They are direct paths and totally separated. On this kill attempt (top kill) there may be multiple paths with nothing separated. Should it be attempted? When everyone is hungry there is really just two question? Who is going to kill the chicken? Next question is how? Then you do a risk analysis to see if you over looked anything. Ring it's neck or swing the hatchet. The main concern is not to lose any fingers in the process. So, lets ring it's neck.

Tex
Tex,
If there ever was a more lucid and well thought out post on any site related to any matter, then I've been out of the loop and didn't see it.

This is the cream of the crop. It will not be fully understood by many, including myself (!) but I know enough to say....."Amen, reverend!!! I luv it when you hold forth!"

Well done,
D
Thanks, that is a very comprehensive answer!

Before they got a new BOP on top of this mess, you predicted they would bury the old BOP in a "Mount St. Helens" of cement. That makes a lot of sense if they absolutely have to insure that all pathways are blocked.

But now there is a new BOP smack dab in the way. I hate to be the little boy following every answer with "why", but it begs the next question: Once they start pumping from the bottom, how do they insure they have sealed all the pathways? Does it even matter, if they can fill in the formation at the bottom and seal the well there?

Thanks,
Russell
Russell......
If BP ever gets ahold of this tiger, hopefully from bottom, but if not possible, then from the top, they will exert enough hydraulic horsepower and inject enough various fluids and cementation that they will not be bound by the perfect laws of hydraulics, thermodynamics, governmental interference, laws of lamination of various cylindrical and juxtaposed columns of ferrous materi known as casing, shrimp prices, pelican head counts, hits on the juke box at the only beer joint on Grande Isle, hooker prices in the sleaziest part of N'Awlins, the various opinions of junior news reporters who know more about hooker prices in N'Awlins that they know about the marshes of Louisiana......puff puff....

Where was I?

OHHHH...OK....they are gonna reach it, then they are gonna firewall about 20,000 HP of red iron with some kind of liquid as a medium, and they are gonna purposely and with malice aforethought pulverize the best damn formation they ever uncovered.

Then they are gonna leave these Un-United States, and watch O'Bummer see how many votes he can get with $20 Billion dollars......

But I'm not bitter..........teheheh
D
Hello all. I don't comment on this forum due to the fact that everything I know about this subject is coming from your collective input. Below is a link to what is apparently the latest development, evidence of a "seep" near the well head. I am very interested in hearing your views about the introduction of a seep into the already large list of variables that could affect determination of the causes of the initial blowout and also strategies for final sealing of this well.

http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/bp-pressed-to-assess-s...

By the way the Coast Guard investigation and survivor testimonies begin again tomorrow, July 19. Information can be accessed at:

http://www.deepwaterhorizonresponse.com/go/doc/3043/788559/

It is refreshing to explore a discussion of professionals with experience in this arena. Thanks for allowing interested non-professionals access to your forum.
Carolyn,
You did good by posting the link to the words of John Hoffmeister, former big cahuna of Shell Oil. We need info on all fronts.

I'm not going to yell at you for his content. You post respectfully and lucidly, and I feel you honestly want a fair and impartial evaluation of what you post and you want questions answered.

For the first two thirds of his diatribe, I just giggled like a school girl. Words like "underdesigned", high pressure, integrity, and phrases like "cement has to sit still or relatively still and dry", with no movement or as little movement as possible.......hints that the casing is "destroyed" down on bottom....these are all chatch phrases to emphasize a point. The one about cement "must" be still or almost still to set up is ludicrous to the point of hilarity.

I woulda liked to have had Mr. Hoffmeister on the pump truck with me just north of Victoria, TX @ 1996 when I was pumping cement down hole at 8.5 bbls per minute and it set up so fast the pressure went from 1200 psi to 5,500 psi in about however long it takes a man to jerk back on a throttle handle.

Its called "flash setting". In my case noted above, it turns out some doofus at the mixing plant grabbed the wrong bin of cement in the yard, and the temperature retarded cement I ordered was sent to a surface hole job, and I got somebody's surface cement, which not only did not have any temperature retarders in it.....it had 2% calcium chloride, which is an accelerator!!!.

I was the guinea pig.....the other poor bstrd didn't have to pump my temp retarded cement around his low temp surface casing and then wonder why it wouldn't set up and test. C'est la vie!!!

But the most annoying thing in Mr. Hoffmeister's broadcast is where he suggests that "oil is caustic" and "steel will disintegrate" in the presence of oil

All you Texans, Okies, Coonasses, Wyomingites, Pennsylvanians, Californians, etc, better pack your bags and get hot-footin' it to Rhode Island!!! Every oil well in the above mentioned states (plus a bunch of others) is about to blow any minute!!! There are wells out there wherein the casing has been exposed to this CAUSTIC, HAZARDOUS, DANGEROUS, ENVIORNMENTALLY CORRUPT substance called oil for 80 days!!! Oops, no, make that 80 YEARS.

Go figger.....

Deeper
Jim I watched the video also and just shook my head-this guy has no clue and it has not stopped to amaze me what they will say to get on camera. All that BS about oil being caustic is where I just stopped the video

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