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Drilling Ahead

World Oilfield Forum

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Explosion-A Discussion of What Actually Happened?

 I will start the discussion with this which came in email a moment ago...

Anybody with any thoughts?


April 26, 2010       Transocean
Rig Disaster: The Well From Hell

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more. Here's another update on the disaster that befell Transocean Ltd. and BP last week in the Gulf of Mexico.
(Thanks to OI reader Steve, in Texas, for sending some of the photos in today’s alert.)

As you know by now, the drilling vessel Deepwater Horizon exploded, burned and sank last week, with the loss of 11 workers and injuries to many more. What happened? What's happening now? What's going to happen? I've spent the weekend working to piece things together.

An Ill-fated Discovery
According to news accounts, at about 10 p.m. CDT last Tuesday, Deepwater Horizon was stable, holding an exact position in calm, dark seas about 45 miles south of the Louisiana coastline. Water depth in the area is 5,000 feet. The vessel manifest listed 126 souls on board.

Deepwater Horizon was finishing work on an exploration well named Macondo, in an area called Mississippi Canyon Block 252. After weeks of drilling, the rig had pushed a bit down over 18,000 feet, into an oil-bearing zone. The Transocean and BP personnel were installing casing in the well. BP was going to seal things up, and then go off and figure out how to produce the oil -- another step entirely in the oil biz.

The Macondo Block 252 reservoir may hold as much as 100 million barrels. That's not as large as other recent oil strikes in the Gulf, but BP management was still pleased. Success is success --
certainly in the risky, deep-water oil environment. The front office of BP Exploration was preparing a press release to announce a "commercial" oil discovery.

This kind of exploration success was par for the course for Deepwater Horizon. A year ago, the vessel set a record at another site in the Gulf, drilling a well just over 35,000 feet and discovering the 3 billion barrel Tiber deposit for BP. SoDeepwater Horizon was a great rig, with a great crew and a superb record. You might even say that is was lucky.

But perhaps some things tempt the Gods. Some actions may invite ill fate. Because suddenly, the wild and wasteful ocean struck with a bolt from the deep.

The Lights Went out;
and Then.
.. 

Witnesses state that the lights flickered on the Deepwater Horizon. Then a massive thud shook the vessel, followed by another strong vibration. Transocean employee Jim Ingram, a seasoned
offshore worker, told the U.K. Times that he was preparing for bed after working a 12-hour shift. "On the second [thud]," said Mr. Ingram, "we knew something was wrong." Indeed, something was very wrong.

Within a moment, a gigantic blast of gas, oil and drilling mud roared up through three miles of down-hole pipe and subsea risers. The fluids burst through the rig floor and ripped up into the gigantic draw-works. Something sparked. The hydrocarbons ignited. In a fraction of a second, the drilling deck of the Deepwater Horizon exploded into a fireball. The scene was an utter conflagration.

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Listing

Evacuate and Abandon
Ship 


There was almost no time to react. Emergency beacons blared. Battery-powered lighting switched on throughout the vessel. Crew members ran to evacuation stations. The order came to abandon ship.
Then from the worst of circumstances came the finest, noblest elements of human behavior. Everyone on the vessel has been through extensive safety training. They knew what to do. Most crew members climbed into covered lifeboats. Other crew members quickly winched the boats, with their shipmates, down to the water. Then those who stayed behind rapidly evacuated in other designated emergency craft.

Some of the crew, however, were trapped in odd parts of the massive vessel, which measures 396 feet by 256 feet -- a bit less than the size of two football fields laid side by side.( This is one big
Drill Ship) They couldn't get to the boats. So they did what they had to do, which for some meant jumping -- and those jumpers did not fare so well. Several men broke bones due to the impact of their 80-foot drop to the sea. Still, it beat burning.

With searchlights providing illumination, as well as the eerie light from the flames of the raging fire, boat handlers pulled colleagues out of the water beneath the burning rig. In some instances, the plastic fittings on the lifeboats melted from the heat.

The flames intensified.
Soon it was impossible for the lifeboats to function near the massive vessel. The small boats moved away from the raging fountain of fire fed by ancient oil and gas from far below.

Transocean Horizon Burning At Night

The lifeboat skippers saved as many as they could find -- 115 -- but couldn't account for 11 workers who were, apparently, on or around the drill deck at the time of the first explosion. Nine of the missing are Transocean employees. Two others work for subcontractors.

Damon
Bankston to the Rescue 


Fate was not entirely cruel that night. Indeed, a supply boat was already en route to the Deepwater
Horizon. It was the Tidewater Damon Bankston, a 260-foot long flat-deck supply vessel.

Damon Bankston heard the distress signal. Her captain did what great captains do. He aimed the bow toward the position of Deepwater Horizon. Then he tore through the water, moved along by four mighty Caterpillar engines rated at 10,200 horsepower. Soon, the Damon Bankston arrived on scene,
sailed straight into the flames and joined the rescue.

Meanwhile, Coast Guard helicopters lifted off from pads in southern Louisiana, and Coast Guard
rescue vessels left their moorings. "You have to go out," is the old Coast Guard saying. "You don't have to come back."

The helicopters flew in the black of night toward a vista of utter disaster. Arriving on scene, the pilots watched in awe as columns of flame shot as high as a 50-story building. The helicopters were buffeted by blasts of super-heated wind coming from the flames, while chunks of soot the size of your hand blew by.

The pilots hovered in the glow of the blazing rig, while Coast Guard medics fast-roped down to the deck of Damon Bankston . The medics quickly assessed the casualties, strapped critically injured crewmen to backboards and hoisted them up to the helicopters. Then the pilots turned north and sped ashore to hospitals.

Uninjured survivors returned to land on the Damon Bankston. And others came out to fight
the blistering flames.

But the Deepwater Horizon wasn't going to make it. The situation deteriorated, to the point of complete catastrophe. The ship was lost.

Transocean Horizon On Fire Sinking

At about 10 a.m. CDT on Thursday morning, 36 hours after the first explosion, the Deepwater Horizon capsized and sank in 5,000 feet of water. According to BP, the hulk is located on the
seafloor, upside-down, about 1,500 feet away from the Macondo well it drilled.

Still Spilling Oil 
On Friday, I told you that the oil well drilled by the Deepwater Horizon was sealed in. The "official" word was that the well wasn't gushing oil into the sea. My sources were no less than U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry, of the New Orleans district, as quoted in The New York Times. 

But over the weekend, Rear Adm. Landry and The New York Times reported that the well IS leaking oil, at a rate of about 1,000 barrels per day.

The on-scene information comes from remotely operated underwater robots that BP and Transocean are using to monitor the well and survey all the other wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon. There's now a large amount of equipment and pipe and a myriad of marine debris on the seafloor near the well. It's a mess.

Apparently, the blowout preventer is not controlling the flow of oil. According to Transocean, the blowout preventer on Deepwater Horizon was manufactured by Cameron Intl. (CAM: NYSE). 

What happened? We don't know that just yet. Earlier reports that underwater robots sealed the blowout preventer were wrong. It's possible that the blowout preventer is only partially closed. We'll find out, eventually. Meanwhile, BP and Transocean have announced that they will make another effort to activate the blowout preventer. They need to stop that oil.

BP is also preparing to drill one or more relief wells to secure the site permanently. BP has mobilized the drilling rig Development Driller III, which is moving into position to drill a second well to intercept the leaking well. With the new well, the drillers will inject a specialized heavy fluid into the original well. This fluid will secure and block the flow of oil or gas and allow BP to permanently seal the first well.

Riser Problems? 

According to the Coast Guard and BP, oil is leaking from two spots along what is left of the riser system. Here's a schematic view:

Transocean Horizon Sea Floor Diagram

Originally, the risers (represented by the blue line in the graphic above) were affixed to the blowout preventer on the seafloor, and extended 5,000 feet straight up to the "moon pool" of the Deepwater Horizon. When the drilling vessel sank, it took the riser piping and bent it around like a pretzel.

The remnants of the riser system now follow a circuitous underwater route. According to BP, the risers extend from the wellhead up through the water column to about 1,500 feet above the seabed.
Then the riser system buckles back down toward the seafloor. (Frankly, I'm astonished that it all held together as well as it has. It's a credit to the manufacturer, which I'll discuss below.)

According to the Transocean website, the riser devices on the Deepwater Horizonwere manufactured by VetcoGray, a division of General Electric Oil & Gas. The specific designation is a "HMF-Class H, 21-inch outside diameter riser; 90 foot long joints with Choke & Kill, and booster and hydraulic  supply lines."

Here's a photo of something similar. These are Vetco risers sections that I saw on another vessel, the Transocean Discoverer Inspiration, when I visited that ship last month:

Transocean Horizon Riser Sections

The different color stripes on the risers indicate differing amounts of buoyancy. The idea is to put heavy riser pipe down at the bottom, connected to more buoyant risers above. The buoyancy
keeps the entire riser system in more or less neutral buoyancy, so that the drill ship doesn't have to somehow hoist up the huge weight of all that pipe.

As you can see, there's a large-diameter pipe in the middle of each riser. That pipe is then encased in a buoyant foam substance. The risers are bolted together at the flange sections. The bolts are about as big as the arm of a very strong man. The nuts, which tighten things down, are the size of paint cans.

After the risers are assembled and hanging down from the drilling vessel, the drilling personnel lower and raise drilling pipe through the large-diameter center riser pipe. All the drilling mud stays inside the drill pipe on the way down hole, and inside the riser pipe on the return.

On the side of the riser sections, you can see smaller-diameter pipes. These are choke & kill, booster and hydraulic pipe components. The pipes run parallel to the large-diameter inner pipe. These pipe systems run down to the blowout preventer on the seafloor.

The idea is to keep the drilling process an enclosed system. All the "drilling stuff" -- the drill-pipe, drilling-mud and drill-cutting returns -- stays inside the large-diameter pipe. The smaller pipes
hold fluid to transmit hydraulic power and help control drilling. In particular, the pipes on the side aid in communicating with and controlling the blowout preventer.

Technical Specs 

Ideally, when the risers are working as intended, nothing leaks out into the sea. Then again, you're not supposed to twist and bend the riser sections like a pretzel. So how strong is a riser
system? Extremely strong, actually.

According to technical literature from GE Oil & Gas, the riser equipment is "designed for use in
high-pressure, critical service and deep-water drilling and production applications." The pressure-containing components are rated for working pressures of 15,000 psi. That's the same as the Cameron blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon. The materials used in risers have
exceptional tensile and bending load characteristics.

According to Vetco paperwork that I've seen, the Class H riser sections have a 3.5 million pound
load-carrying capacity. That's the equivalent weight of about four fully fueled
Boeing 747s. These risers are super strong.

Still, it's not just any one single piece of riser section that does it all. These sections all get bolted
together, for 5,000 feet in this case. The riser sections all have to work together as a system. The whole string is only as strong as the weakest spot. And yes, even the strongest steel will break if you apply enough stress.

It all has to work together. You've got the riser sections, along with things called HMF flanged riser connectors. Then there are HMF riser joints; flex joints; telescopic joints; and, near the top, things called "fluid-bearing, nonintegral tensioner rings." Together, these all comprise the marine riser system.

In general, the riser components compensate for heave, surge, sway, offset and torque of the drilling vessel as the ship bounces around on the sea surface. The bottom line is to maintain a tight seal -- what's called "integrity" -- between the subsea blowout preventer stack and the surface
during drilling operations.

Down at the bottom, at the seafloor, the risers are connected to the blowout preventer by a connector device. The GE-Vetco spec is for a device that accommodates 7 million foot-pounds of bending
load capacity. That's about eight fully fueled Boeing 747s.

What's the idea? You want a secure connection between the high-pressure wellhead system and
the subsea blowout preventer stack. That's where mankind's best steel meets Mother Nature's high pressures.

High pressures? You had better believe it. And in this case, Mother Nature won. So looking forward, there's going to be a lot of forensic engineering on the well design and how things got monitored
during drilling. Transocean drilled the well, but BP designed it. So the key question is how did the down-hole pressures get away like they did?

What Happens
Now? 


It's a good thing that the Deepwater Horizon didn't settle right on top of the well. At least there's room for the remotely operated vehicles to maneuver. Also, there's still a lot of riser still floating in the water column. So there's some element of integrity going down to the blowout preventer.

It's absolutely imperative to shut off that oil flow. We just have to hope and pray that the BP and Transocean people can get the blowout preventer shut off. Or that there's enough integrity to the risers somehow to get in there and control the leaks, perhaps with some sort of plug. One other idea is to lower a large "hood" over the leak and capture the oil so it can be pumped up to a storage tanker ship.

Meanwhile, the relief well has to go down -- carefully and safely. This Macondo well is history. Seal it. Mark it. Give it back to the sea. Move on. Don't tempt fate on this
one. And wow... for a relatively modest-sized deep-water discovery, this
thing sure has turned into the well from hell.

Welcome to the World of Deep-water Risk 

As I've said before, this accident is Mother Nature's wake-up call to everyone. Deep-water drilling is a high-stakes game. It's not exactly a "casino," in that there's a heck of a lot of settled science,
engineering and technology involved.  But we're sure finding out the hard way what all the risks are. And it's becoming more and more clear how the totality of risk is a moving target. There's geologic risk, technical risk, engineering risk, environmental risk, capital risk and market risk.


With each deep well, these risks all come together over one very tiny spot at the bottom of the ocean. So for all the oil that's out there under deep water -- and it's a lot -- the long-term calculus of risk and return is difficult to quantify.

There's more to discuss, but I'll end here today. I'll update you as things evolve. This is big news all through the offshore industry. There are HUGE environmental issues, and certainly big political repercussions. I won't go there just now. For now, I'll just send out collective best wishes to the people at Transocean, BP, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management and so many more. I'm sure they're doing their best.

Thanks for reading...

(Name Withheld)

Tags: Transocean, cause, deepwater, discussion, explosion, happened, horizon, what

Views: 9995

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Replies to This Discussion

3000 bbl is a lot- and to stop it you keep mud as light as possible and add LCM or Lost Circulation Material to the mud as needed. (fine ground marble-mica-cedar fiber ,etc) Even the surge pressure from bringing your pumps back on to fast after a connection can cause you to lose returns. Like I have said before-we walk a fine line between losing returns and taking a kick at times.
Thanks Curtis. Here's something that may prove true if the relief well encounters the same thing as DWH did. Somebody was asking about the depth and mud weight on the relief well and said the relief well is using 14.2 ppg mud. They could be coming in hot for what they are about to hit and there could be a mud loss again that could complicate things. If they hit porous formation in the reserve the bottom could fall out on them too, if that is what did happen with DWH. Could be a learn from history kind of thing there. It could also suggest that when they go to bottom kill the well, they may need to use a much lighter mud to get a good upflow from the formation pressure backside, as opposed to the kill mud blowing out the bottom too. They should finesse the bottom kill, trying to use mud no heavier than just what is needed to do the job, in my opinion.
Pretty sure I got that from the first round of live testimony in front of some congressional panel.

D
The thing about drilling the second or relief well is you now know where these loss zones are and you case them off...I do not think they are experiencing the same degree of problems as the Macondo exploratory well....also-if I read your casing chart posted yesterday correctly the FIT or Formation Integrity Test showed the final section to be 16 ppg...the zones above that showed Leak Off Tests in the 14 ppg range. I would have to look again..but I feel the 14.2 is to control the gas and not lose any mud to the formation. Like I have said, the lighter the mud wt the faster the ROP...and they are in a hurry no doubt so I figure they are running as light as possible.... you have to understand that if you lose mud down here because your mud wt is to high then you lose hydrostatic on the well...which lets gas in...then you have a kick...so then you close the well in and pressure builds and you lose more mud...then another kick enters the well...as they rise to the surface they expand and displace more mud-which lets more gas in the wellbore...pretty soon you have 3 or 4 kicks in the well and you have lost it....I cannot say it to you in strong enough words for you to understand-its a fine line we walk with mud weight
It isn't the zones above the formation horizon that are the concern, it is what happens when they break through the horizon and they won't have casing around the bit there. They are probably going to intersect a comfortable safe distance above the horizon and just avoid the potential problem or most of it. I'm not the honcho, but that's what I would do, and transition to lighter mud at the intersect using pumping to hold the balance. I just checked and they are way deeper than to do what I was thinking, so they are taking a risk there.
The sea floor emits methane and crude all the time, these doom and gloom, and speaking out of turn, is just morons talking, that have nothing better to do. Trying to generate some sort of controversy, because success is boring and can't continue to use a big crisis if there is none. If Robert Gibbs told me water was wet, I would ask for a second opinion. He is an absolute idiot, and his string are control by bigger idiots. The White House had BP running around with sample jars on the end of a ROV's arm, trying to catch samples of bubbles that pop out of the ocean floor.

"Pay no attention to that man behind the curtain!"
Mark, agreed methane gas is expressed to the surface all over the world, as we speak. But OMI this is different.I was on a well in south La. that took a high pressure underground blowout. The result was that every water well within in two miles of the blowout was contaminated. The idea that the casing string is comprimised is valid. I'm not saying that a large volume of gas is escaping from the producing formation. If you have experience with gas , and I'm sure you do, then you know it would not take a large volume to cause a leak two miles away at the pressures that exist. I'm not submitting this is an underground blowout but I am submitting that there is a leak within the structure of the existing casing string. The measured pressure readings that BP is getting from the cap could well occur if the casing string was only partialy compromised.
Keep in mind the recorded pressure from the cap versus the mud weight of the relief well is far greater than the 7.4 lbs (?) that should be the kill weight for this well. I think what we are all concerned about is that the current procedures being used could result in further compromise of this well bore.
Very nice point Mr Parkin. The capping strategy seems to have caused lots of head-scratching; your suggestion seems totally plausible. If this is part of the strategy, it is still not clear why they need to keep the well totally "shut-in" for any longer.
If the well is "getting depleted" as some are suggesting, the entire Macondo project would probably have been a loss-maker even if it went smoothly.
Number crunching? Some times it gets you into a mess instead of out of one. Always look for the reason for the action, not at the solution. Solutions are not always based on the problem at hand. Shut in well = no flow. Shut in well = no provable pollution unless it gives up around the well head itself. If that happens you can not prove how much pollution. You are back to guessing. Flow the well, and choke it back until you have about 2350 PSI on the well head transducer and meter the flow. The casing will not rupture during this flowing because flowing pressure will be 2370 PSI at the well head. Just as it was when the oil was flowing directly out of the top of the well against the hydrostatic of sea water. The pressure outside of the casing is also equal to the flowing pressure inside the capped but flowing well choked back to 2370 PSI at the BOP. Therefore there is actually no differential pressure inside or outside the casing. Why do they want to keep the well shut in? I stated this on May 30th in my previous discussions. Reasonable doubt is the reason. If they open the well and flow it as I described a moment ago all reasonable doubt is gone. They will be able to know how much this well has flowed per day since the beginning without reasonable doubt. That would be the value the law suits will go after. That is why they do not want to open the well and flow it. There is no other reason to take such a chance. They have a third of the ships in the sea on location, they should have enough to process the flowing oil. They do not have to flow the oil at that rate to prevent a possible casing breach. They could most likely flow 5,000 bbls a day to prevent the well from possibly breaching the casing. The problem is if they open the well and flow it at all; somebody is going to be smart enough to ask them to flow this well holding 2370 PSI on the pressure transducer at the BOP long enough to remove reasonable doubt. That is why they would rather go for the whole pot all chips in when they are one card away from a straight flush. If you remember from the very first day they always said they would never be able to contain all the oil. Well now they are, but they damn sure don't want to flow it. That can be just too expensive when reasonable doubt is gone.
Tex, Numbers are fun that's for sure. They ought to add up to make sense and when they don't, then things get more interesting. You aren't saying you think that BP might publish confusing or misleading numbers or conceal good numbers, that would be cynical and cruel, huh. Please look at something for me regarding the overbalancing of the well. I am trying to reconcile numbers that don't seem to reconcile. It may be practice for offshore wells to overbalance by what is in the riser, and consider the seawater pressure too in doing a sort of algebra on the balancing of the well so that if the rig has to detach, that the well is balanced by what is left standing in the hole. But to accomplish that, it would seem that the well would be overbalanced as a matter of course beecause of the height of the riser holding the mud, and this is different than for an onshore well where the balancing of the mud could be fine tuned. Looking at the wellbore layout in column K there is overbalance charted that shows the situation I describe, so the situation on overbalancing with the mud appears to be a given for an offshore well and this would seem to be particularly true during the early part of the drilling and in the final part of the drilling also. Am I interpreting the figures correctly on the overbalance and why it would necessarily be there for an offshore well ? That by itself would also make the offshore wells more dangerous via circulation loss into fractured formations if I am understanding correctly. The layout document attached is not all the information, but is just a summary snapshot. The whole story we don't have is likely where is found the needed information to better understand what actually did happen there with DWH.
Attachments:
I looked at your data, but did not study it. You have been working pretty hard at this all in all I can see. I am not saying they are publishing bad numbers. I am only saying that there is one number that do not want anyone to know for sure. That is how much oil per day was flowing from the MC-252 for the last 80+ days. The rest does not matter to them at this point in time. They are what they are. Everyone of any great importance are aware of the other numbers concerning pore pressure etc. inside and outside of BP. There are too many people involved to sweep them under the rug. I just suggest that there are reasons for everything, and when chances are taken that are not required such as a full shut in " you have to ask yourself WHY" Why not flow the well and not take a chance of breaching the casing or having an underground blow out at some depth of the well. If they let it flow it is not going to breach. So, why not let it flow until they get the relief well in place. I am not talking about full flow. Just some flow. When they intersect the MC-252 with the relief well there will be a tendency to have loss circulation on the relief well. If the relief well is being drilled with 14.2 PPG mud weight when the intersection occurs the pressure on the MC-252 well at the transducer is going to increase by about 3900 PSI if it is closed in at the time of intercepting the well bore. It will complete a U-tube between the two wells. If they have the MC-252 closed in at that moment of interception with 6,800 PSI and then the U-tube from the 14.2 in the relief well is added the pressure is going to increase on the MC-252. To exactly what I am not sure. I am also not sure where they are reading their pressures. If the well is shut in now subsea and they are taking their reading from a transducer on the side of the new BOP then you must realize that the well is missing a column of fluid to the surface. Years ago there were no well head transducers. Everything was simply recorded at surface. Say the well in closed. No communication to surface. Well has 6 PPG oil//gas mixture and has a transducer reading of 6700 PSI. Now lets go back to the old days. You have a choke line going to surface full of the same 6 PPG fluid and you read the surface gauge. Is is not going to read 6700 PSI, it will read 5047 PSI. Depending on where they are getting their readings will throw your calculations in a spin. If you are not correct about the location it will be impossible to be accurate. In the old days no one went around calculating the pressure at the actual well head. It was not important. It is only important now when there is no more rig to read the surface pressure at. With all the calculations flying around it is best to forget about the strength of rocks, lamination, external pressures exerted against the casing etc at different depths of sea water and formations and just work the numbers from the specs and watch the sub sea monitor to see if it leaks. I like numbers to, I have worked them a lot in my life in well control schools on rigs and in some very difficult situations. Usually when it is all over they either worked or they didn't. It makes us feel good when we are right and can figure something out before it happens. It would be great if everyone had that ability. After all if they did have that ability none of this would have ever happened and we would not be rattling numbers now. But keep up the good work. It's good practice.

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