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World Oilfield Forum

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Explosion-A Discussion of What Actually Happened?

 I will start the discussion with this which came in email a moment ago...

Anybody with any thoughts?


April 26, 2010       Transocean
Rig Disaster: The Well From Hell

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more. Here's another update on the disaster that befell Transocean Ltd. and BP last week in the Gulf of Mexico.
(Thanks to OI reader Steve, in Texas, for sending some of the photos in today’s alert.)

As you know by now, the drilling vessel Deepwater Horizon exploded, burned and sank last week, with the loss of 11 workers and injuries to many more. What happened? What's happening now? What's going to happen? I've spent the weekend working to piece things together.

An Ill-fated Discovery
According to news accounts, at about 10 p.m. CDT last Tuesday, Deepwater Horizon was stable, holding an exact position in calm, dark seas about 45 miles south of the Louisiana coastline. Water depth in the area is 5,000 feet. The vessel manifest listed 126 souls on board.

Deepwater Horizon was finishing work on an exploration well named Macondo, in an area called Mississippi Canyon Block 252. After weeks of drilling, the rig had pushed a bit down over 18,000 feet, into an oil-bearing zone. The Transocean and BP personnel were installing casing in the well. BP was going to seal things up, and then go off and figure out how to produce the oil -- another step entirely in the oil biz.

The Macondo Block 252 reservoir may hold as much as 100 million barrels. That's not as large as other recent oil strikes in the Gulf, but BP management was still pleased. Success is success --
certainly in the risky, deep-water oil environment. The front office of BP Exploration was preparing a press release to announce a "commercial" oil discovery.

This kind of exploration success was par for the course for Deepwater Horizon. A year ago, the vessel set a record at another site in the Gulf, drilling a well just over 35,000 feet and discovering the 3 billion barrel Tiber deposit for BP. SoDeepwater Horizon was a great rig, with a great crew and a superb record. You might even say that is was lucky.

But perhaps some things tempt the Gods. Some actions may invite ill fate. Because suddenly, the wild and wasteful ocean struck with a bolt from the deep.

The Lights Went out;
and Then.
.. 

Witnesses state that the lights flickered on the Deepwater Horizon. Then a massive thud shook the vessel, followed by another strong vibration. Transocean employee Jim Ingram, a seasoned
offshore worker, told the U.K. Times that he was preparing for bed after working a 12-hour shift. "On the second [thud]," said Mr. Ingram, "we knew something was wrong." Indeed, something was very wrong.

Within a moment, a gigantic blast of gas, oil and drilling mud roared up through three miles of down-hole pipe and subsea risers. The fluids burst through the rig floor and ripped up into the gigantic draw-works. Something sparked. The hydrocarbons ignited. In a fraction of a second, the drilling deck of the Deepwater Horizon exploded into a fireball. The scene was an utter conflagration.

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Listing

Evacuate and Abandon
Ship 


There was almost no time to react. Emergency beacons blared. Battery-powered lighting switched on throughout the vessel. Crew members ran to evacuation stations. The order came to abandon ship.
Then from the worst of circumstances came the finest, noblest elements of human behavior. Everyone on the vessel has been through extensive safety training. They knew what to do. Most crew members climbed into covered lifeboats. Other crew members quickly winched the boats, with their shipmates, down to the water. Then those who stayed behind rapidly evacuated in other designated emergency craft.

Some of the crew, however, were trapped in odd parts of the massive vessel, which measures 396 feet by 256 feet -- a bit less than the size of two football fields laid side by side.( This is one big
Drill Ship) They couldn't get to the boats. So they did what they had to do, which for some meant jumping -- and those jumpers did not fare so well. Several men broke bones due to the impact of their 80-foot drop to the sea. Still, it beat burning.

With searchlights providing illumination, as well as the eerie light from the flames of the raging fire, boat handlers pulled colleagues out of the water beneath the burning rig. In some instances, the plastic fittings on the lifeboats melted from the heat.

The flames intensified.
Soon it was impossible for the lifeboats to function near the massive vessel. The small boats moved away from the raging fountain of fire fed by ancient oil and gas from far below.

Transocean Horizon Burning At Night

The lifeboat skippers saved as many as they could find -- 115 -- but couldn't account for 11 workers who were, apparently, on or around the drill deck at the time of the first explosion. Nine of the missing are Transocean employees. Two others work for subcontractors.

Damon
Bankston to the Rescue 


Fate was not entirely cruel that night. Indeed, a supply boat was already en route to the Deepwater
Horizon. It was the Tidewater Damon Bankston, a 260-foot long flat-deck supply vessel.

Damon Bankston heard the distress signal. Her captain did what great captains do. He aimed the bow toward the position of Deepwater Horizon. Then he tore through the water, moved along by four mighty Caterpillar engines rated at 10,200 horsepower. Soon, the Damon Bankston arrived on scene,
sailed straight into the flames and joined the rescue.

Meanwhile, Coast Guard helicopters lifted off from pads in southern Louisiana, and Coast Guard
rescue vessels left their moorings. "You have to go out," is the old Coast Guard saying. "You don't have to come back."

The helicopters flew in the black of night toward a vista of utter disaster. Arriving on scene, the pilots watched in awe as columns of flame shot as high as a 50-story building. The helicopters were buffeted by blasts of super-heated wind coming from the flames, while chunks of soot the size of your hand blew by.

The pilots hovered in the glow of the blazing rig, while Coast Guard medics fast-roped down to the deck of Damon Bankston . The medics quickly assessed the casualties, strapped critically injured crewmen to backboards and hoisted them up to the helicopters. Then the pilots turned north and sped ashore to hospitals.

Uninjured survivors returned to land on the Damon Bankston. And others came out to fight
the blistering flames.

But the Deepwater Horizon wasn't going to make it. The situation deteriorated, to the point of complete catastrophe. The ship was lost.

Transocean Horizon On Fire Sinking

At about 10 a.m. CDT on Thursday morning, 36 hours after the first explosion, the Deepwater Horizon capsized and sank in 5,000 feet of water. According to BP, the hulk is located on the
seafloor, upside-down, about 1,500 feet away from the Macondo well it drilled.

Still Spilling Oil 
On Friday, I told you that the oil well drilled by the Deepwater Horizon was sealed in. The "official" word was that the well wasn't gushing oil into the sea. My sources were no less than U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry, of the New Orleans district, as quoted in The New York Times. 

But over the weekend, Rear Adm. Landry and The New York Times reported that the well IS leaking oil, at a rate of about 1,000 barrels per day.

The on-scene information comes from remotely operated underwater robots that BP and Transocean are using to monitor the well and survey all the other wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon. There's now a large amount of equipment and pipe and a myriad of marine debris on the seafloor near the well. It's a mess.

Apparently, the blowout preventer is not controlling the flow of oil. According to Transocean, the blowout preventer on Deepwater Horizon was manufactured by Cameron Intl. (CAM: NYSE). 

What happened? We don't know that just yet. Earlier reports that underwater robots sealed the blowout preventer were wrong. It's possible that the blowout preventer is only partially closed. We'll find out, eventually. Meanwhile, BP and Transocean have announced that they will make another effort to activate the blowout preventer. They need to stop that oil.

BP is also preparing to drill one or more relief wells to secure the site permanently. BP has mobilized the drilling rig Development Driller III, which is moving into position to drill a second well to intercept the leaking well. With the new well, the drillers will inject a specialized heavy fluid into the original well. This fluid will secure and block the flow of oil or gas and allow BP to permanently seal the first well.

Riser Problems? 

According to the Coast Guard and BP, oil is leaking from two spots along what is left of the riser system. Here's a schematic view:

Transocean Horizon Sea Floor Diagram

Originally, the risers (represented by the blue line in the graphic above) were affixed to the blowout preventer on the seafloor, and extended 5,000 feet straight up to the "moon pool" of the Deepwater Horizon. When the drilling vessel sank, it took the riser piping and bent it around like a pretzel.

The remnants of the riser system now follow a circuitous underwater route. According to BP, the risers extend from the wellhead up through the water column to about 1,500 feet above the seabed.
Then the riser system buckles back down toward the seafloor. (Frankly, I'm astonished that it all held together as well as it has. It's a credit to the manufacturer, which I'll discuss below.)

According to the Transocean website, the riser devices on the Deepwater Horizonwere manufactured by VetcoGray, a division of General Electric Oil & Gas. The specific designation is a "HMF-Class H, 21-inch outside diameter riser; 90 foot long joints with Choke & Kill, and booster and hydraulic  supply lines."

Here's a photo of something similar. These are Vetco risers sections that I saw on another vessel, the Transocean Discoverer Inspiration, when I visited that ship last month:

Transocean Horizon Riser Sections

The different color stripes on the risers indicate differing amounts of buoyancy. The idea is to put heavy riser pipe down at the bottom, connected to more buoyant risers above. The buoyancy
keeps the entire riser system in more or less neutral buoyancy, so that the drill ship doesn't have to somehow hoist up the huge weight of all that pipe.

As you can see, there's a large-diameter pipe in the middle of each riser. That pipe is then encased in a buoyant foam substance. The risers are bolted together at the flange sections. The bolts are about as big as the arm of a very strong man. The nuts, which tighten things down, are the size of paint cans.

After the risers are assembled and hanging down from the drilling vessel, the drilling personnel lower and raise drilling pipe through the large-diameter center riser pipe. All the drilling mud stays inside the drill pipe on the way down hole, and inside the riser pipe on the return.

On the side of the riser sections, you can see smaller-diameter pipes. These are choke & kill, booster and hydraulic pipe components. The pipes run parallel to the large-diameter inner pipe. These pipe systems run down to the blowout preventer on the seafloor.

The idea is to keep the drilling process an enclosed system. All the "drilling stuff" -- the drill-pipe, drilling-mud and drill-cutting returns -- stays inside the large-diameter pipe. The smaller pipes
hold fluid to transmit hydraulic power and help control drilling. In particular, the pipes on the side aid in communicating with and controlling the blowout preventer.

Technical Specs 

Ideally, when the risers are working as intended, nothing leaks out into the sea. Then again, you're not supposed to twist and bend the riser sections like a pretzel. So how strong is a riser
system? Extremely strong, actually.

According to technical literature from GE Oil & Gas, the riser equipment is "designed for use in
high-pressure, critical service and deep-water drilling and production applications." The pressure-containing components are rated for working pressures of 15,000 psi. That's the same as the Cameron blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon. The materials used in risers have
exceptional tensile and bending load characteristics.

According to Vetco paperwork that I've seen, the Class H riser sections have a 3.5 million pound
load-carrying capacity. That's the equivalent weight of about four fully fueled
Boeing 747s. These risers are super strong.

Still, it's not just any one single piece of riser section that does it all. These sections all get bolted
together, for 5,000 feet in this case. The riser sections all have to work together as a system. The whole string is only as strong as the weakest spot. And yes, even the strongest steel will break if you apply enough stress.

It all has to work together. You've got the riser sections, along with things called HMF flanged riser connectors. Then there are HMF riser joints; flex joints; telescopic joints; and, near the top, things called "fluid-bearing, nonintegral tensioner rings." Together, these all comprise the marine riser system.

In general, the riser components compensate for heave, surge, sway, offset and torque of the drilling vessel as the ship bounces around on the sea surface. The bottom line is to maintain a tight seal -- what's called "integrity" -- between the subsea blowout preventer stack and the surface
during drilling operations.

Down at the bottom, at the seafloor, the risers are connected to the blowout preventer by a connector device. The GE-Vetco spec is for a device that accommodates 7 million foot-pounds of bending
load capacity. That's about eight fully fueled Boeing 747s.

What's the idea? You want a secure connection between the high-pressure wellhead system and
the subsea blowout preventer stack. That's where mankind's best steel meets Mother Nature's high pressures.

High pressures? You had better believe it. And in this case, Mother Nature won. So looking forward, there's going to be a lot of forensic engineering on the well design and how things got monitored
during drilling. Transocean drilled the well, but BP designed it. So the key question is how did the down-hole pressures get away like they did?

What Happens
Now? 


It's a good thing that the Deepwater Horizon didn't settle right on top of the well. At least there's room for the remotely operated vehicles to maneuver. Also, there's still a lot of riser still floating in the water column. So there's some element of integrity going down to the blowout preventer.

It's absolutely imperative to shut off that oil flow. We just have to hope and pray that the BP and Transocean people can get the blowout preventer shut off. Or that there's enough integrity to the risers somehow to get in there and control the leaks, perhaps with some sort of plug. One other idea is to lower a large "hood" over the leak and capture the oil so it can be pumped up to a storage tanker ship.

Meanwhile, the relief well has to go down -- carefully and safely. This Macondo well is history. Seal it. Mark it. Give it back to the sea. Move on. Don't tempt fate on this
one. And wow... for a relatively modest-sized deep-water discovery, this
thing sure has turned into the well from hell.

Welcome to the World of Deep-water Risk 

As I've said before, this accident is Mother Nature's wake-up call to everyone. Deep-water drilling is a high-stakes game. It's not exactly a "casino," in that there's a heck of a lot of settled science,
engineering and technology involved.  But we're sure finding out the hard way what all the risks are. And it's becoming more and more clear how the totality of risk is a moving target. There's geologic risk, technical risk, engineering risk, environmental risk, capital risk and market risk.


With each deep well, these risks all come together over one very tiny spot at the bottom of the ocean. So for all the oil that's out there under deep water -- and it's a lot -- the long-term calculus of risk and return is difficult to quantify.

There's more to discuss, but I'll end here today. I'll update you as things evolve. This is big news all through the offshore industry. There are HUGE environmental issues, and certainly big political repercussions. I won't go there just now. For now, I'll just send out collective best wishes to the people at Transocean, BP, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management and so many more. I'm sure they're doing their best.

Thanks for reading...

(Name Withheld)

Tags: Transocean, cause, deepwater, discussion, explosion, happened, horizon, what

Views: 9997

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Replies to This Discussion

Amen my brother. Prayers to the families, Lord please give them peace and hope in this time of tragedy. Amen.
I wonder what went wrong out there on the DW Horizon.
Trying to understand is difficult.
Whatever happened must have happened quickly.
It is unusual to have something happen so quick that it was not detected. (Two MI mudloggers still in the unit)
The detection equipment should have been awesome on that rig.
HOW can a 'BUBBLE' of gas or whatever get from 5000ft to the rig floor undetected?
If it exploded on reaching the rig floor, there would not be time to react.
Even inside the tempered glass enclosure of the 'drillers' cabin, that would have imploded on them instantly.
ALL controls for the BOP are within that enclosure.
Including the 'diverter' bag just below the rotary table.
They were possibly 'fried' and destroyed instantly.
THEN, the failsafe system should have activated the BOP failsafe mode.
With the rig 'drifting' off location, (TOTAL power loss) when the riser reached a pre-determined angle, the FAILSAFE release of the LMRP should have activated.
This does not appear to have happened.
The riser is across the seabed, (or is it) still connected to the LMRP, as is the DP still in the riser.
The leak at the seabed is coming, (according to photos published) from the riser and the DP, which is located 1500m (???) away from the wellhead.
Attempts by an ROV to activate the BOP functions should be easy.
The ROV plugs into the intervention panel of choice for the function required, (this is the hydraulic fluid supply).
Then the ROV functions the required valve OPEN.
Pumping SHOULD then function the ram of choice.
It appears this has NOT happened.
Something is drastically wrong.

Maybe they need a HP water jet to cut the riser and DP off at the riser connector. (NO ignition source)
ALL these deepwater systems now have emergency recovery slings (supposed to have anyway) on the LMRP and the BOP.

If you cut the riser as suggested.
The ROV activate the LMRP release of the H4 connector.
ROV connect recovery lines from a salvage vessel and recover the LMRP which I imagine contains the Upper Annular.

Another rig 'could' then RIH and connect to the BOP with a compatable H4 connector attached to a recovery system and use that to pump into the well if required.

Dreaming again maybe.
Did not think much when I wrote the above, just put the words on paper.
I believe it is feasible.

I mourn and pray for those lost.
Very basically.
A 36" conductor is jetted into the seabed, usually with a 'mudmat' connected to the wellhead. This is usually run with a 'drill-ahead' tool.
The jetting is done with the next size drill bit and BHA spaced-out inside the 36" conductor with the bit very close to the 'shoe', depending on the client whether it is inside or protruding. Upon reaching the desired depth (usually with the mudmat and wellhead around 2m above the seabed) a soaking period of a few hours is required for the casing to settle. NO CEMENT.
The 'drill-ahead' BHA will be released from the 'drill-ahead' tool, and drill to the next section TD.
Release the 'drill-ahead' tool and POH.
RIH with the intermediate (20") casing, install the 18 3/4" wellhead. Depending on the client, install the preferred cementing inner string with (cement plugs) below the wellhead running tool. RIH with the dedicated running string, land in the 30" or 36" wellhead. Overpull to ensure 'locked in'. Cement APP. Release the running tool and POH.
RIH with the BOP on the required riser. Land on the 18 3/4" wellhead, latch the wellhead connector. Depending on the client, function & PT the BOP.
Choke and kill lines are attached to the riser as are a rigid conduit to supply hydraulic fluid for the BOP functions. An additional line is attached to act as a 'booster' line to assist the movement of fluids in the riser annulus.
The choke and kill lines are connected to the choke manifold, which is connected to the 'gas buster' system.
At the top of the riser a telescopic joint is installed to compensate for the movement of the rig in the seas. This is connected to the diverter under the rig floor, an insert is installed to divert any flow through the diverter lines and hopefully safely overboard.
I can answer any other questions.
Something went drastically wrong in this situation, there are so many procedures and safeguards that are expected to be followed.
Just when I was going to ask a number of questions about how the "underwater stack" is assembled in response to Karl's questions, along comes Alan with a great number of answers. Thanks Alan!
Great story. But realisticly, a number of people should have seen something was not right with thr trip tank or gas monitors, or conection flow monitors. A gas bubble doesn't rise 18,000' without leaving a number of calling cards. BOP's are tested every 10 - 14 days and yes they could have failed, but a gas kick leaves a bunch of warning signs and deepwater rigs especially are to watch for any sign . . . even the slightest of gas invasion. MY prayers are with the families who lost love ones. The oilfield is not a job for just anyone . . .it takes a special breed of person to put his or life on the line to provide for their families and supply the worlds energy needs. We will morn, we will pray, we will learn and We Will Drill Again!
I am 100% agree with Keith that its failur of BOP. what was the reason every body should figure out.
but no one can say its suddenly happen. still senario is not clear that what was going on there Cementing or RIH Csg. Hope reason will find out soon.
I found this in a blog that was published today and it sheds a bunch of light on the events leading up to the explosion-Its a long blog so i will share an excerpt and a link so you can read it
The discussion leaders included Mike Smith, a 15-year veteran of Transocean (since retired) and two attorneys who have dealt with oil spill litigation in the past. I learned a lot, and thought I’d share some of their perspectives with the readers of Seis Matters.

According to the Transocean veteran, BP had discovered significant quantities of oil and gas at Macondo, the name of the field that the Deepwater Horizon rig was drilling. BP had reached total depth and penetrated the reservoir horizon at 18,000 feet. Halliburton had cemented the last casing string in the well and inserted several cement plugs within it which BP intended to drill out at some future point when they returned to Macondo to begin full-field development.

With the cement plugs in place, Transocean had begun the process of removing the drill string in the well (used during the cementing operation) and had begun to replace the heavier mud in the wellbore with less dense sea water. This is apparently a common practice, as the plugs are designed to contain the reservoir fluids downhole. Effectively, the Deepwater Horizon was hours away from moving off the Macondo location.

At this point, some speculation begins. The leading hypothesis is that the cement plugs failed. The drilling crew wouldn’t be expecting a failure and perhaps weren’t monitoring the systems that detect an influx of fluids into the well, drill string, and drill pipe riser. Unbeknownst to those on the rig, a mixture of gas and water was coming up the drill string and riser to the surface and the deck of the Deepwater Horizon. The volatile mixture of high-pressure hydrocarbons likely ignited quickly and unexpectedly, killing the 11 individuals who were on the drilling floor itself.

Normally, one of these drillers would have hit the “panic button” that closed the blowout preventers (BOP) on the seabed, but likely didn’t have the time to do it. The toolpusher a bit farther away also has access to a panic button, but himself may have been incapacitated in the explosion or, if the electrical switches to the BOP were cut when the riser exploded, may have been unsuccessful in his attempt.

The next line of defense is called a “dead man’s switch” ....(continued at blog)

http://blog.iongeo.com/
The loss of 11 men is saddening. They intrude into my waking conciousness, asking for answers.
Just got this from an excerpt of what halliburton is reporting:

"Halliburton had completed the cementing of the final production casing string in accordance with the well design approximately 20 hours prior to the incident. The cement slurry design was consistent with that utilized in other similar applications. In accordance with accepted industry practice approved by our customers, tests demonstrating the integrity of the production casing string were completed.

At the time of the incident, well operations had not yet reached the point requiring the placement of the final cement plug which would
enable the planned temporary abandonment of the well, consistent with normal oilfield practice..."


That's pretty much it, the rest was just info that they continue to assist on a relief well
An incredible story. thank you for sharing this.
Check this link, finally we get to hear from one of the hands on the rig.

http://www.marklevinshow.com/Article.asp?id=1790422&spid=32364
I understand this guy being interviewed is very hesitant in divulging to much, but, I get the feeling he may have been on this rig, but was not there when it happened. Just my 'gut' feeling listening to the words he is using.

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