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Drilling Ahead

World Oilfield Forum

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Explosion-A Discussion of What Actually Happened?

 I will start the discussion with this which came in email a moment ago...

Anybody with any thoughts?


April 26, 2010       Transocean
Rig Disaster: The Well From Hell

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more. Here's another update on the disaster that befell Transocean Ltd. and BP last week in the Gulf of Mexico.
(Thanks to OI reader Steve, in Texas, for sending some of the photos in today’s alert.)

As you know by now, the drilling vessel Deepwater Horizon exploded, burned and sank last week, with the loss of 11 workers and injuries to many more. What happened? What's happening now? What's going to happen? I've spent the weekend working to piece things together.

An Ill-fated Discovery
According to news accounts, at about 10 p.m. CDT last Tuesday, Deepwater Horizon was stable, holding an exact position in calm, dark seas about 45 miles south of the Louisiana coastline. Water depth in the area is 5,000 feet. The vessel manifest listed 126 souls on board.

Deepwater Horizon was finishing work on an exploration well named Macondo, in an area called Mississippi Canyon Block 252. After weeks of drilling, the rig had pushed a bit down over 18,000 feet, into an oil-bearing zone. The Transocean and BP personnel were installing casing in the well. BP was going to seal things up, and then go off and figure out how to produce the oil -- another step entirely in the oil biz.

The Macondo Block 252 reservoir may hold as much as 100 million barrels. That's not as large as other recent oil strikes in the Gulf, but BP management was still pleased. Success is success --
certainly in the risky, deep-water oil environment. The front office of BP Exploration was preparing a press release to announce a "commercial" oil discovery.

This kind of exploration success was par for the course for Deepwater Horizon. A year ago, the vessel set a record at another site in the Gulf, drilling a well just over 35,000 feet and discovering the 3 billion barrel Tiber deposit for BP. SoDeepwater Horizon was a great rig, with a great crew and a superb record. You might even say that is was lucky.

But perhaps some things tempt the Gods. Some actions may invite ill fate. Because suddenly, the wild and wasteful ocean struck with a bolt from the deep.

The Lights Went out;
and Then.
.. 

Witnesses state that the lights flickered on the Deepwater Horizon. Then a massive thud shook the vessel, followed by another strong vibration. Transocean employee Jim Ingram, a seasoned
offshore worker, told the U.K. Times that he was preparing for bed after working a 12-hour shift. "On the second [thud]," said Mr. Ingram, "we knew something was wrong." Indeed, something was very wrong.

Within a moment, a gigantic blast of gas, oil and drilling mud roared up through three miles of down-hole pipe and subsea risers. The fluids burst through the rig floor and ripped up into the gigantic draw-works. Something sparked. The hydrocarbons ignited. In a fraction of a second, the drilling deck of the Deepwater Horizon exploded into a fireball. The scene was an utter conflagration.

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Listing

Evacuate and Abandon
Ship 


There was almost no time to react. Emergency beacons blared. Battery-powered lighting switched on throughout the vessel. Crew members ran to evacuation stations. The order came to abandon ship.
Then from the worst of circumstances came the finest, noblest elements of human behavior. Everyone on the vessel has been through extensive safety training. They knew what to do. Most crew members climbed into covered lifeboats. Other crew members quickly winched the boats, with their shipmates, down to the water. Then those who stayed behind rapidly evacuated in other designated emergency craft.

Some of the crew, however, were trapped in odd parts of the massive vessel, which measures 396 feet by 256 feet -- a bit less than the size of two football fields laid side by side.( This is one big
Drill Ship) They couldn't get to the boats. So they did what they had to do, which for some meant jumping -- and those jumpers did not fare so well. Several men broke bones due to the impact of their 80-foot drop to the sea. Still, it beat burning.

With searchlights providing illumination, as well as the eerie light from the flames of the raging fire, boat handlers pulled colleagues out of the water beneath the burning rig. In some instances, the plastic fittings on the lifeboats melted from the heat.

The flames intensified.
Soon it was impossible for the lifeboats to function near the massive vessel. The small boats moved away from the raging fountain of fire fed by ancient oil and gas from far below.

Transocean Horizon Burning At Night

The lifeboat skippers saved as many as they could find -- 115 -- but couldn't account for 11 workers who were, apparently, on or around the drill deck at the time of the first explosion. Nine of the missing are Transocean employees. Two others work for subcontractors.

Damon
Bankston to the Rescue 


Fate was not entirely cruel that night. Indeed, a supply boat was already en route to the Deepwater
Horizon. It was the Tidewater Damon Bankston, a 260-foot long flat-deck supply vessel.

Damon Bankston heard the distress signal. Her captain did what great captains do. He aimed the bow toward the position of Deepwater Horizon. Then he tore through the water, moved along by four mighty Caterpillar engines rated at 10,200 horsepower. Soon, the Damon Bankston arrived on scene,
sailed straight into the flames and joined the rescue.

Meanwhile, Coast Guard helicopters lifted off from pads in southern Louisiana, and Coast Guard
rescue vessels left their moorings. "You have to go out," is the old Coast Guard saying. "You don't have to come back."

The helicopters flew in the black of night toward a vista of utter disaster. Arriving on scene, the pilots watched in awe as columns of flame shot as high as a 50-story building. The helicopters were buffeted by blasts of super-heated wind coming from the flames, while chunks of soot the size of your hand blew by.

The pilots hovered in the glow of the blazing rig, while Coast Guard medics fast-roped down to the deck of Damon Bankston . The medics quickly assessed the casualties, strapped critically injured crewmen to backboards and hoisted them up to the helicopters. Then the pilots turned north and sped ashore to hospitals.

Uninjured survivors returned to land on the Damon Bankston. And others came out to fight
the blistering flames.

But the Deepwater Horizon wasn't going to make it. The situation deteriorated, to the point of complete catastrophe. The ship was lost.

Transocean Horizon On Fire Sinking

At about 10 a.m. CDT on Thursday morning, 36 hours after the first explosion, the Deepwater Horizon capsized and sank in 5,000 feet of water. According to BP, the hulk is located on the
seafloor, upside-down, about 1,500 feet away from the Macondo well it drilled.

Still Spilling Oil 
On Friday, I told you that the oil well drilled by the Deepwater Horizon was sealed in. The "official" word was that the well wasn't gushing oil into the sea. My sources were no less than U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry, of the New Orleans district, as quoted in The New York Times. 

But over the weekend, Rear Adm. Landry and The New York Times reported that the well IS leaking oil, at a rate of about 1,000 barrels per day.

The on-scene information comes from remotely operated underwater robots that BP and Transocean are using to monitor the well and survey all the other wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon. There's now a large amount of equipment and pipe and a myriad of marine debris on the seafloor near the well. It's a mess.

Apparently, the blowout preventer is not controlling the flow of oil. According to Transocean, the blowout preventer on Deepwater Horizon was manufactured by Cameron Intl. (CAM: NYSE). 

What happened? We don't know that just yet. Earlier reports that underwater robots sealed the blowout preventer were wrong. It's possible that the blowout preventer is only partially closed. We'll find out, eventually. Meanwhile, BP and Transocean have announced that they will make another effort to activate the blowout preventer. They need to stop that oil.

BP is also preparing to drill one or more relief wells to secure the site permanently. BP has mobilized the drilling rig Development Driller III, which is moving into position to drill a second well to intercept the leaking well. With the new well, the drillers will inject a specialized heavy fluid into the original well. This fluid will secure and block the flow of oil or gas and allow BP to permanently seal the first well.

Riser Problems? 

According to the Coast Guard and BP, oil is leaking from two spots along what is left of the riser system. Here's a schematic view:

Transocean Horizon Sea Floor Diagram

Originally, the risers (represented by the blue line in the graphic above) were affixed to the blowout preventer on the seafloor, and extended 5,000 feet straight up to the "moon pool" of the Deepwater Horizon. When the drilling vessel sank, it took the riser piping and bent it around like a pretzel.

The remnants of the riser system now follow a circuitous underwater route. According to BP, the risers extend from the wellhead up through the water column to about 1,500 feet above the seabed.
Then the riser system buckles back down toward the seafloor. (Frankly, I'm astonished that it all held together as well as it has. It's a credit to the manufacturer, which I'll discuss below.)

According to the Transocean website, the riser devices on the Deepwater Horizonwere manufactured by VetcoGray, a division of General Electric Oil & Gas. The specific designation is a "HMF-Class H, 21-inch outside diameter riser; 90 foot long joints with Choke & Kill, and booster and hydraulic  supply lines."

Here's a photo of something similar. These are Vetco risers sections that I saw on another vessel, the Transocean Discoverer Inspiration, when I visited that ship last month:

Transocean Horizon Riser Sections

The different color stripes on the risers indicate differing amounts of buoyancy. The idea is to put heavy riser pipe down at the bottom, connected to more buoyant risers above. The buoyancy
keeps the entire riser system in more or less neutral buoyancy, so that the drill ship doesn't have to somehow hoist up the huge weight of all that pipe.

As you can see, there's a large-diameter pipe in the middle of each riser. That pipe is then encased in a buoyant foam substance. The risers are bolted together at the flange sections. The bolts are about as big as the arm of a very strong man. The nuts, which tighten things down, are the size of paint cans.

After the risers are assembled and hanging down from the drilling vessel, the drilling personnel lower and raise drilling pipe through the large-diameter center riser pipe. All the drilling mud stays inside the drill pipe on the way down hole, and inside the riser pipe on the return.

On the side of the riser sections, you can see smaller-diameter pipes. These are choke & kill, booster and hydraulic pipe components. The pipes run parallel to the large-diameter inner pipe. These pipe systems run down to the blowout preventer on the seafloor.

The idea is to keep the drilling process an enclosed system. All the "drilling stuff" -- the drill-pipe, drilling-mud and drill-cutting returns -- stays inside the large-diameter pipe. The smaller pipes
hold fluid to transmit hydraulic power and help control drilling. In particular, the pipes on the side aid in communicating with and controlling the blowout preventer.

Technical Specs 

Ideally, when the risers are working as intended, nothing leaks out into the sea. Then again, you're not supposed to twist and bend the riser sections like a pretzel. So how strong is a riser
system? Extremely strong, actually.

According to technical literature from GE Oil & Gas, the riser equipment is "designed for use in
high-pressure, critical service and deep-water drilling and production applications." The pressure-containing components are rated for working pressures of 15,000 psi. That's the same as the Cameron blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon. The materials used in risers have
exceptional tensile and bending load characteristics.

According to Vetco paperwork that I've seen, the Class H riser sections have a 3.5 million pound
load-carrying capacity. That's the equivalent weight of about four fully fueled
Boeing 747s. These risers are super strong.

Still, it's not just any one single piece of riser section that does it all. These sections all get bolted
together, for 5,000 feet in this case. The riser sections all have to work together as a system. The whole string is only as strong as the weakest spot. And yes, even the strongest steel will break if you apply enough stress.

It all has to work together. You've got the riser sections, along with things called HMF flanged riser connectors. Then there are HMF riser joints; flex joints; telescopic joints; and, near the top, things called "fluid-bearing, nonintegral tensioner rings." Together, these all comprise the marine riser system.

In general, the riser components compensate for heave, surge, sway, offset and torque of the drilling vessel as the ship bounces around on the sea surface. The bottom line is to maintain a tight seal -- what's called "integrity" -- between the subsea blowout preventer stack and the surface
during drilling operations.

Down at the bottom, at the seafloor, the risers are connected to the blowout preventer by a connector device. The GE-Vetco spec is for a device that accommodates 7 million foot-pounds of bending
load capacity. That's about eight fully fueled Boeing 747s.

What's the idea? You want a secure connection between the high-pressure wellhead system and
the subsea blowout preventer stack. That's where mankind's best steel meets Mother Nature's high pressures.

High pressures? You had better believe it. And in this case, Mother Nature won. So looking forward, there's going to be a lot of forensic engineering on the well design and how things got monitored
during drilling. Transocean drilled the well, but BP designed it. So the key question is how did the down-hole pressures get away like they did?

What Happens
Now? 


It's a good thing that the Deepwater Horizon didn't settle right on top of the well. At least there's room for the remotely operated vehicles to maneuver. Also, there's still a lot of riser still floating in the water column. So there's some element of integrity going down to the blowout preventer.

It's absolutely imperative to shut off that oil flow. We just have to hope and pray that the BP and Transocean people can get the blowout preventer shut off. Or that there's enough integrity to the risers somehow to get in there and control the leaks, perhaps with some sort of plug. One other idea is to lower a large "hood" over the leak and capture the oil so it can be pumped up to a storage tanker ship.

Meanwhile, the relief well has to go down -- carefully and safely. This Macondo well is history. Seal it. Mark it. Give it back to the sea. Move on. Don't tempt fate on this
one. And wow... for a relatively modest-sized deep-water discovery, this
thing sure has turned into the well from hell.

Welcome to the World of Deep-water Risk 

As I've said before, this accident is Mother Nature's wake-up call to everyone. Deep-water drilling is a high-stakes game. It's not exactly a "casino," in that there's a heck of a lot of settled science,
engineering and technology involved.  But we're sure finding out the hard way what all the risks are. And it's becoming more and more clear how the totality of risk is a moving target. There's geologic risk, technical risk, engineering risk, environmental risk, capital risk and market risk.


With each deep well, these risks all come together over one very tiny spot at the bottom of the ocean. So for all the oil that's out there under deep water -- and it's a lot -- the long-term calculus of risk and return is difficult to quantify.

There's more to discuss, but I'll end here today. I'll update you as things evolve. This is big news all through the offshore industry. There are HUGE environmental issues, and certainly big political repercussions. I won't go there just now. For now, I'll just send out collective best wishes to the people at Transocean, BP, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management and so many more. I'm sure they're doing their best.

Thanks for reading...

(Name Withheld)

Tags: Transocean, cause, deepwater, discussion, explosion, happened, horizon, what

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Replies to This Discussion

It is presently configured for an "off label" ( hail Mary ) kind of use so that is kind of a gray area. It is probably barely within "official" limits. But you see it is a miraculous kind of component. It was never designed to operate as a mooring cleat for a mile of riser which became an anchor line for a drilling rig which had lost power and was adrift off station above, experiencing massive explosions, capsizing and sinking while still attached to a mile of riser, buckling that riser with two drill pipes inside of the FlexJoint, pinned to its travel limit and then bending the entire BOP stack and well head from the torque, while the FlexJoint still seems to be okay. These events are not in the product brochure as normal stresses for a used and ten year old part, so they must build 'em good. It would probably leak before it just blows up and the pressure would probably be 10000 or so for the leaking to start. The test pressure for the standard big one is published as 9000 but what is the actual ultimate limit I am not sure they know.
Never ceases to amaze me the idiotic media, that idiot Shepherd Smith included on Fox, have been going on and on for near three months, "Why don't they do something to stop this crisis, why all the extra caution and delays, and failure after failure." blah, blah, blah....

Now they bit the bullet and shut the thing in, a bit risky, but they were being pushed to act. And then Smith and company find out the possible bad scenarios that could happen if things go south, and now they run around with the Henny Penny syndrome. Now they all are fear mongering since this U of H Prof gave them the worst case scenarios. "Why are they taking these chances?" "Why this? Why that?" Jeez can they please make up their damn minds.......
I'm glad to see they finally got the thing shut down. But I still say they could have done this 2 months ago. Not to mention the fact the original blowout should never have happened in the first place. So I'm not inclined to call these people heros by any means.

When I screw up on a job, and then fix my screw up, I don't get an atta boy for my fix, I continue to get reamed for my screw up.
Translucent plume as a "waypoint" indicator , who woulda thunk it ? Ha, I'm lovin' it.
Pretty isn't it ? It was glowing in the lights , the ROV's were playing in it

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oMQRcg9Vcio&feature=channel
Curious -- anyone know if the escaping gas is rising all the way up to the surface, and the men on the ships and rigs have a concern about directly breathing it?
Anyone know what pressure they are reading at the stack?
Awhile ago there was the following information released:

" The well integrity test is ongoing.
- Currently the well remains shut-in with no oil flowing into the Gulf; any significant change to this operation will be announced via a press release.
- Pressure continues to rise and is currently above 6700 psi."

This is also confirming my theory. That rising pressure should slow as it nears plateau and then gradually drop with cooling to a stable endpoint, however there may be and probably will be an abort of that maneuver if there is escaping methane observed in more than expected trace amounts coming from around the wellhead casing or from cracks in the sea floor.
There will probably an ROV tasked to sit there and watch and do patrols inspecting the area of those eight ball valves near the sea floor below the original BOP and wellhead. There is an ROV there now Skandi ROV - 2
Methane is not toxic, it is odorless, and colorless; but methane can kill by displacing oxygen (this is the danger inside mine shafts). Most mammals can survive down to an O2 level of appr. 16% at sea level. (normal air is 21% O2 and 78% Nitrogen).

The real hazard is combustion. Luckily the depth and temp do away with most of the methane.

Estimates of out-gassing when the LMRP Cap was not in place put the "natural gas" quantity around 50,000,000 cu.ft. /day. Most of this vented methane cooled and precipitated as methane ice (clathrate) back to the sea floor, while the smaller portion was vaulted up the oil plume beyond the methane boundary level at -3000 to -1800 foot depth (where the temp is higher and pressure is lower). Once there, the clathrate disassociates and goes into solution with the water. By the time the methane comes out of solution at the surface, it is dispersed over a wide enough area to mitigate the danger.
I'll go out on a limb with some guessing here, not even having crunched all the numbers or referencing the mud logs to get closer, but estimate their plateau pressure is going to be around 8000 psi decreasing to a stable endpoint around 7500 psi as read on gauges at the depth where the stack sits now. The pressures continuing slowly and still more slowly upward and then back downward to the endpoint could take days or more to become static.
Keith Jones’ welcome comments regarding well pressures etc. have caused some good discussion here, and this is an extension of that.

Here are a few points of clarification, so we iggorant folk can better follow this train of thought. You old hands already know all about this, so please bear with this newcomer. Pardon me if I’m not yet familiar with your wide and impressive oilwell-lingo vocabulary.

--Have any of you ever hooked a fish (such as a sea bass or red snapper) in the ocean and reeled him up from the bottom so fast, that the pressure differential made his eyes bug out of his head? If you take your time and reel them in slowly, their eyes don't pop out. The only point here being RELATIVE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL. Inside, vs. outside.

Keith Jones’ stated "7,500 psi as read on gauges at the depth where the stack sits now" would actually be 9,800 psi relative to the surface of the ocean. The ambient 2,300 psi of seawater pressure at the BOP level lowers the measured RELATIVE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL by that amount.

For example, let's assume that 7,500 psi at the BOP is a constant static pressure, and also assume that you just have gas inside the pipe, to eliminate gravity variables due to the weight of a column of fluid. If you had one continuous 5,000-foot string of strong (capped) pipe connecting the drill rig to the BOP, and measured the relative inside-versus-outside pressure at several points along that pipe, it would linearly increase from 7.5K psi to 9.8K psi as you rose up to the surface of the ocean.

Extending that train of thought, if you had one continuous 18,000-foot string of strong (capped) pipe connecting the drill rig directly to the reservoir with no obstructions (and still assuming nothing but static gas inside the pipe), the RELATIVE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL of inside-versus-outside of the pipe would be almost zero at the very bottom, and steadily increase as you ascended upwards. The highest pressure readings would be found at the drill rig itself, which under these theoretical conditions would experience a pressure differential reading amounting to the actual pressure inside the reservoir at the very bottom of the pipe. (Which was a respectable 13,000 psi, back in April. This sort of scenario must be a driller's worst nightmare, especially since the burst-strength of the riser going up to the Deepwater Horizon was reported to be just 500 psi. No wonder a 2,300 psi kick did so much damage.)

However, when any kind of fluid/liquid resides in a vertical pipe, variables caused by gravity enter into the equation. Replace the gas with fluid, and gravity (the weight, or pressure, of the vertical column of a fluid) substantially lowers the RELATIVE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL at any given point in the pipe, from the bottom all the way up to the top. Ideally when drilling, the weight/density of the drill mud is chosen so skillfully that it almost exactly matches the inside-outside pressure characteristics of the hole to the point where any measured RELATIVE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL is close to zero psi from top to bottom, no matter how deep the hole.

The lighter (less dense) the fluid, the LESS gravity will cause it to lower the overall pressure readings, while the heavier (more dense) the fluid, the MORE gravity will cause it to drop the overall pressure readings. It's an over-simplification, but the density scale increases as you proceed from gas, to petroleum, to water, to drill-mud, and on to kill-mud and cement. Drilling mud density is varied in real time as work progresses, according to on-the-spot needs.

All that being said, 7,500 psi of RELATIVE PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL at the BOP still looks like it exceeds the burst strength of several of the upper pipes (no matter what they’re called - conductor, liner, casing, etc.). Since the ambient pressure differential decreases as the depth increases, and also since the smaller pipes have a higher burst strength than the larger ones, there are a lot of variables to calculate in.

No matter how you cut it, a 7,500 psi static pressure test at the BOP still looks pretty darned adventurous.

Tom
For the record, the Horizon had a Vetco HMF-Classs H 21" OD riser; 90 ft long joints with C&K and booster and hydraulic supply lines. The riser is rated @ 10K psi.
Ooops!

Thanks, Ace. Oh, crap. Now I've gotta go dig up where I read that 500 psi figure. What sticks in my memory is that there was a 500 psi weak point just below the DWH, and I didn't just make that figure up. Geez, I hope it wasn't from some flaky gub'mint website. (blush) Ya gotta do yer homework, or she might not be home when you get back...

I hope my 500-psi 'factoid' doesn't detract from the 'relative pressure' point that I was attempting to remove the BS-factor from. The only variable still hanging-fire on that subject is that it's probably impossible to tell what the ambient local pressure is on any given depth of the well in the ground below the BOP, unless drilling records are able to reveal such. (Are they?) Any positive pressure outside the wellbore, at any given depth, would of course be factored against the inside pressure to give a real-world indication of the actual stress on the pipe(s) at that point.

And I'm curious -- the ambient seawater pressure, at about 2,300 psi, is pretty hefty. Doesn’t that ambient pressure follow the wellbore on down outside the pipe, so the pressure is always AT LEAST that much, or is there such an effective sealing job (cementing of casing) that the ambient outside-the-pipe pressure can eventually do whatever it wants as you go deeper? It's hard to imagine ambient underground pressure (relative to our zero psi reference point here at sea level) doing anything but increasing as you drill deeper and install more casing, but you guys pumping the mud know the answer to that one.

When you're down 10,000 feet, for example, do you ever find an actual void that swallows up the drill mud for awhile, until the void gets filled? If you do reach such a void, do you rapidly lower the point until it hits something solid and then continue as before, or do you wait for the mud to fill the hole and then go on? Or, maybe that just never happens.

I could probably Google and get some answers, but I'm impressed with the technical skill -- and patience -- that you guys show here, and besides, hair we are.

Regards,

Tom

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