Oil Drilling


Recent Rotary Rig Count May 10th, 2013



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UNITED STATES 

5/10/13 

1769

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Drilling Ahead

World Oilfield Forum

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Explosion-A Discussion of What Actually Happened?

 I will start the discussion with this which came in email a moment ago...

Anybody with any thoughts?


April 26, 2010       Transocean
Rig Disaster: The Well From Hell

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more. Here's another update on the disaster that befell Transocean Ltd. and BP last week in the Gulf of Mexico.
(Thanks to OI reader Steve, in Texas, for sending some of the photos in today’s alert.)

As you know by now, the drilling vessel Deepwater Horizon exploded, burned and sank last week, with the loss of 11 workers and injuries to many more. What happened? What's happening now? What's going to happen? I've spent the weekend working to piece things together.

An Ill-fated Discovery
According to news accounts, at about 10 p.m. CDT last Tuesday, Deepwater Horizon was stable, holding an exact position in calm, dark seas about 45 miles south of the Louisiana coastline. Water depth in the area is 5,000 feet. The vessel manifest listed 126 souls on board.

Deepwater Horizon was finishing work on an exploration well named Macondo, in an area called Mississippi Canyon Block 252. After weeks of drilling, the rig had pushed a bit down over 18,000 feet, into an oil-bearing zone. The Transocean and BP personnel were installing casing in the well. BP was going to seal things up, and then go off and figure out how to produce the oil -- another step entirely in the oil biz.

The Macondo Block 252 reservoir may hold as much as 100 million barrels. That's not as large as other recent oil strikes in the Gulf, but BP management was still pleased. Success is success --
certainly in the risky, deep-water oil environment. The front office of BP Exploration was preparing a press release to announce a "commercial" oil discovery.

This kind of exploration success was par for the course for Deepwater Horizon. A year ago, the vessel set a record at another site in the Gulf, drilling a well just over 35,000 feet and discovering the 3 billion barrel Tiber deposit for BP. SoDeepwater Horizon was a great rig, with a great crew and a superb record. You might even say that is was lucky.

But perhaps some things tempt the Gods. Some actions may invite ill fate. Because suddenly, the wild and wasteful ocean struck with a bolt from the deep.

The Lights Went out;
and Then.
.. 

Witnesses state that the lights flickered on the Deepwater Horizon. Then a massive thud shook the vessel, followed by another strong vibration. Transocean employee Jim Ingram, a seasoned
offshore worker, told the U.K. Times that he was preparing for bed after working a 12-hour shift. "On the second [thud]," said Mr. Ingram, "we knew something was wrong." Indeed, something was very wrong.

Within a moment, a gigantic blast of gas, oil and drilling mud roared up through three miles of down-hole pipe and subsea risers. The fluids burst through the rig floor and ripped up into the gigantic draw-works. Something sparked. The hydrocarbons ignited. In a fraction of a second, the drilling deck of the Deepwater Horizon exploded into a fireball. The scene was an utter conflagration.

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Listing

Evacuate and Abandon
Ship 


There was almost no time to react. Emergency beacons blared. Battery-powered lighting switched on throughout the vessel. Crew members ran to evacuation stations. The order came to abandon ship.
Then from the worst of circumstances came the finest, noblest elements of human behavior. Everyone on the vessel has been through extensive safety training. They knew what to do. Most crew members climbed into covered lifeboats. Other crew members quickly winched the boats, with their shipmates, down to the water. Then those who stayed behind rapidly evacuated in other designated emergency craft.

Some of the crew, however, were trapped in odd parts of the massive vessel, which measures 396 feet by 256 feet -- a bit less than the size of two football fields laid side by side.( This is one big
Drill Ship) They couldn't get to the boats. So they did what they had to do, which for some meant jumping -- and those jumpers did not fare so well. Several men broke bones due to the impact of their 80-foot drop to the sea. Still, it beat burning.

With searchlights providing illumination, as well as the eerie light from the flames of the raging fire, boat handlers pulled colleagues out of the water beneath the burning rig. In some instances, the plastic fittings on the lifeboats melted from the heat.

The flames intensified.
Soon it was impossible for the lifeboats to function near the massive vessel. The small boats moved away from the raging fountain of fire fed by ancient oil and gas from far below.

Transocean Horizon Burning At Night

The lifeboat skippers saved as many as they could find -- 115 -- but couldn't account for 11 workers who were, apparently, on or around the drill deck at the time of the first explosion. Nine of the missing are Transocean employees. Two others work for subcontractors.

Damon
Bankston to the Rescue 


Fate was not entirely cruel that night. Indeed, a supply boat was already en route to the Deepwater
Horizon. It was the Tidewater Damon Bankston, a 260-foot long flat-deck supply vessel.

Damon Bankston heard the distress signal. Her captain did what great captains do. He aimed the bow toward the position of Deepwater Horizon. Then he tore through the water, moved along by four mighty Caterpillar engines rated at 10,200 horsepower. Soon, the Damon Bankston arrived on scene,
sailed straight into the flames and joined the rescue.

Meanwhile, Coast Guard helicopters lifted off from pads in southern Louisiana, and Coast Guard
rescue vessels left their moorings. "You have to go out," is the old Coast Guard saying. "You don't have to come back."

The helicopters flew in the black of night toward a vista of utter disaster. Arriving on scene, the pilots watched in awe as columns of flame shot as high as a 50-story building. The helicopters were buffeted by blasts of super-heated wind coming from the flames, while chunks of soot the size of your hand blew by.

The pilots hovered in the glow of the blazing rig, while Coast Guard medics fast-roped down to the deck of Damon Bankston . The medics quickly assessed the casualties, strapped critically injured crewmen to backboards and hoisted them up to the helicopters. Then the pilots turned north and sped ashore to hospitals.

Uninjured survivors returned to land on the Damon Bankston. And others came out to fight
the blistering flames.

But the Deepwater Horizon wasn't going to make it. The situation deteriorated, to the point of complete catastrophe. The ship was lost.

Transocean Horizon On Fire Sinking

At about 10 a.m. CDT on Thursday morning, 36 hours after the first explosion, the Deepwater Horizon capsized and sank in 5,000 feet of water. According to BP, the hulk is located on the
seafloor, upside-down, about 1,500 feet away from the Macondo well it drilled.

Still Spilling Oil 
On Friday, I told you that the oil well drilled by the Deepwater Horizon was sealed in. The "official" word was that the well wasn't gushing oil into the sea. My sources were no less than U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry, of the New Orleans district, as quoted in The New York Times. 

But over the weekend, Rear Adm. Landry and The New York Times reported that the well IS leaking oil, at a rate of about 1,000 barrels per day.

The on-scene information comes from remotely operated underwater robots that BP and Transocean are using to monitor the well and survey all the other wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon. There's now a large amount of equipment and pipe and a myriad of marine debris on the seafloor near the well. It's a mess.

Apparently, the blowout preventer is not controlling the flow of oil. According to Transocean, the blowout preventer on Deepwater Horizon was manufactured by Cameron Intl. (CAM: NYSE). 

What happened? We don't know that just yet. Earlier reports that underwater robots sealed the blowout preventer were wrong. It's possible that the blowout preventer is only partially closed. We'll find out, eventually. Meanwhile, BP and Transocean have announced that they will make another effort to activate the blowout preventer. They need to stop that oil.

BP is also preparing to drill one or more relief wells to secure the site permanently. BP has mobilized the drilling rig Development Driller III, which is moving into position to drill a second well to intercept the leaking well. With the new well, the drillers will inject a specialized heavy fluid into the original well. This fluid will secure and block the flow of oil or gas and allow BP to permanently seal the first well.

Riser Problems? 

According to the Coast Guard and BP, oil is leaking from two spots along what is left of the riser system. Here's a schematic view:

Transocean Horizon Sea Floor Diagram

Originally, the risers (represented by the blue line in the graphic above) were affixed to the blowout preventer on the seafloor, and extended 5,000 feet straight up to the "moon pool" of the Deepwater Horizon. When the drilling vessel sank, it took the riser piping and bent it around like a pretzel.

The remnants of the riser system now follow a circuitous underwater route. According to BP, the risers extend from the wellhead up through the water column to about 1,500 feet above the seabed.
Then the riser system buckles back down toward the seafloor. (Frankly, I'm astonished that it all held together as well as it has. It's a credit to the manufacturer, which I'll discuss below.)

According to the Transocean website, the riser devices on the Deepwater Horizonwere manufactured by VetcoGray, a division of General Electric Oil & Gas. The specific designation is a "HMF-Class H, 21-inch outside diameter riser; 90 foot long joints with Choke & Kill, and booster and hydraulic  supply lines."

Here's a photo of something similar. These are Vetco risers sections that I saw on another vessel, the Transocean Discoverer Inspiration, when I visited that ship last month:

Transocean Horizon Riser Sections

The different color stripes on the risers indicate differing amounts of buoyancy. The idea is to put heavy riser pipe down at the bottom, connected to more buoyant risers above. The buoyancy
keeps the entire riser system in more or less neutral buoyancy, so that the drill ship doesn't have to somehow hoist up the huge weight of all that pipe.

As you can see, there's a large-diameter pipe in the middle of each riser. That pipe is then encased in a buoyant foam substance. The risers are bolted together at the flange sections. The bolts are about as big as the arm of a very strong man. The nuts, which tighten things down, are the size of paint cans.

After the risers are assembled and hanging down from the drilling vessel, the drilling personnel lower and raise drilling pipe through the large-diameter center riser pipe. All the drilling mud stays inside the drill pipe on the way down hole, and inside the riser pipe on the return.

On the side of the riser sections, you can see smaller-diameter pipes. These are choke & kill, booster and hydraulic pipe components. The pipes run parallel to the large-diameter inner pipe. These pipe systems run down to the blowout preventer on the seafloor.

The idea is to keep the drilling process an enclosed system. All the "drilling stuff" -- the drill-pipe, drilling-mud and drill-cutting returns -- stays inside the large-diameter pipe. The smaller pipes
hold fluid to transmit hydraulic power and help control drilling. In particular, the pipes on the side aid in communicating with and controlling the blowout preventer.

Technical Specs 

Ideally, when the risers are working as intended, nothing leaks out into the sea. Then again, you're not supposed to twist and bend the riser sections like a pretzel. So how strong is a riser
system? Extremely strong, actually.

According to technical literature from GE Oil & Gas, the riser equipment is "designed for use in
high-pressure, critical service and deep-water drilling and production applications." The pressure-containing components are rated for working pressures of 15,000 psi. That's the same as the Cameron blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon. The materials used in risers have
exceptional tensile and bending load characteristics.

According to Vetco paperwork that I've seen, the Class H riser sections have a 3.5 million pound
load-carrying capacity. That's the equivalent weight of about four fully fueled
Boeing 747s. These risers are super strong.

Still, it's not just any one single piece of riser section that does it all. These sections all get bolted
together, for 5,000 feet in this case. The riser sections all have to work together as a system. The whole string is only as strong as the weakest spot. And yes, even the strongest steel will break if you apply enough stress.

It all has to work together. You've got the riser sections, along with things called HMF flanged riser connectors. Then there are HMF riser joints; flex joints; telescopic joints; and, near the top, things called "fluid-bearing, nonintegral tensioner rings." Together, these all comprise the marine riser system.

In general, the riser components compensate for heave, surge, sway, offset and torque of the drilling vessel as the ship bounces around on the sea surface. The bottom line is to maintain a tight seal -- what's called "integrity" -- between the subsea blowout preventer stack and the surface
during drilling operations.

Down at the bottom, at the seafloor, the risers are connected to the blowout preventer by a connector device. The GE-Vetco spec is for a device that accommodates 7 million foot-pounds of bending
load capacity. That's about eight fully fueled Boeing 747s.

What's the idea? You want a secure connection between the high-pressure wellhead system and
the subsea blowout preventer stack. That's where mankind's best steel meets Mother Nature's high pressures.

High pressures? You had better believe it. And in this case, Mother Nature won. So looking forward, there's going to be a lot of forensic engineering on the well design and how things got monitored
during drilling. Transocean drilled the well, but BP designed it. So the key question is how did the down-hole pressures get away like they did?

What Happens
Now? 


It's a good thing that the Deepwater Horizon didn't settle right on top of the well. At least there's room for the remotely operated vehicles to maneuver. Also, there's still a lot of riser still floating in the water column. So there's some element of integrity going down to the blowout preventer.

It's absolutely imperative to shut off that oil flow. We just have to hope and pray that the BP and Transocean people can get the blowout preventer shut off. Or that there's enough integrity to the risers somehow to get in there and control the leaks, perhaps with some sort of plug. One other idea is to lower a large "hood" over the leak and capture the oil so it can be pumped up to a storage tanker ship.

Meanwhile, the relief well has to go down -- carefully and safely. This Macondo well is history. Seal it. Mark it. Give it back to the sea. Move on. Don't tempt fate on this
one. And wow... for a relatively modest-sized deep-water discovery, this
thing sure has turned into the well from hell.

Welcome to the World of Deep-water Risk 

As I've said before, this accident is Mother Nature's wake-up call to everyone. Deep-water drilling is a high-stakes game. It's not exactly a "casino," in that there's a heck of a lot of settled science,
engineering and technology involved.  But we're sure finding out the hard way what all the risks are. And it's becoming more and more clear how the totality of risk is a moving target. There's geologic risk, technical risk, engineering risk, environmental risk, capital risk and market risk.


With each deep well, these risks all come together over one very tiny spot at the bottom of the ocean. So for all the oil that's out there under deep water -- and it's a lot -- the long-term calculus of risk and return is difficult to quantify.

There's more to discuss, but I'll end here today. I'll update you as things evolve. This is big news all through the offshore industry. There are HUGE environmental issues, and certainly big political repercussions. I won't go there just now. For now, I'll just send out collective best wishes to the people at Transocean, BP, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management and so many more. I'm sure they're doing their best.

Thanks for reading...

(Name Withheld)

Tags: Transocean, cause, deepwater, discussion, explosion, happened, horizon, what

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Replies to This Discussion

Curtis asked, "Why do they keep the well shut-in?"

You got me...politics?

In the Tech brief Sunday morning, Doug Settles, remarked that they had seen bubbles venting around the wellhead. He said they were trying to capture samples for analysis. Also, Mr. Settles remarked that the cold sea floor and high pressure (to their advantage) would instantly freeze any leaking methane to ice (see Methane Clathrate phase diagram). I guess they are viewing the slow gas leak as a self-cauterizing wound.

The problem with this is, like you pointed out Curtis, it could get worse.

The well is now a giant chromatography column. Different species of petroleum gases are separated into boundary layers depending upon their weight, phase, heat properties, etc... It could be that our leak resides at the same depth that the propane, butane, or hexane occupies in the column. None of these species will form clathrate on contact with 30'F sea water at 2230 psi, they will just continue to vent and tend to erode the surfaces of cement or rock (if these are the materials) holding the leak channel together.

Just a gut feeling, but leaving this thing brewing is a bad idea. Take it to production until it can be killed. If they need to choke it during the kill operation, that option will be available again if they don't waste that possibility now.
Posted 2 hours ago

WASHINGTON — A White House spokesman says BP's ruptured oil well is leaking at the top, along with seepage about two miles away.

Robert Gibbs also says officials are monitoring bubbles that can be seen on an underwater camera.

Leaks could mean the cap on the well has to be opened to prevent oil and gas from escaping elsewhere.

The mechanical cap on the well stopped the flow of oil into the Gulf of Mexico on Thursday.


My thoughts-If gas is reaching the surface 2 miles away we now have an underground blowout-anyone else think the same?
Curtis, unfortunately I tend to agree. Actually I've been concerned about the hard shut in from the start. IMO everything from the cap down has been compromised as a result of 80 days of exposure to uncontrolled oil and gas (along with sand particles, shale, etc ) flowing at high pressure. This would result in a sandblasting effect on casing walls and the BOP. Having a gas leak 2 miles away (unconfirmed as far as I can tell ), means there is communication from the producing sand to the adjacent formations, and that gas is migrating on the "path of least resistance". This would not be a good scenario at many levels.

Just my take on it, Davdi.
Things are not as bad as they have seemed. I have been crunching numbers and reviewing numbers and have caught some discrepancies which have enormous bearing on how good a look the numbers are giving of what is actually going on. Using one set of bad numbers as the baseline causes everything else to be affected from there if the baseline is wrong. There has been a lot of discussion around the original formation pressure based on 14.2 mud and that appears to be wrong. The schematic for the well shows a formation pressure as pore pressure at 18,206 balanced with 12.6 ppg mud. That is 18206 X 12.6 X .052 = 11928 psi The 6800 psi which has been posted by BP as the shut in pressure in the capping stack is NOT a differential pressure reading subsea but is an adjusted pressure figure with respect to normal 1 atmosphere. The differential subsea reading would be 2188 psi less at the 4925 foot depth at the top of the capping stack, 6800 - 2188 = 4612 psi is what a gauge on the capping stack would actually show as corresponding with the published 6800 psi figure. If the formation before any depletion was at 11928, then looking downhole from the same 4925 foot depth atop the capping stack, the undepleted previous formation pressure is 11928 - 3227 = 8701 . ( The adjustment is for the 12.6 mud which was in the 4925 feet above when the 11928 figure was obtained. 4925 X 12.6 X .052 = 3227 ) So as differential pressures, the difference between what a gauge on the capping stack would read and the formation pressure (also differential ) is 8701 - 4612 = 4089 . The original depth was 18206 and the top of the capping stack is at 4925 so there is 18206 - 4925 = 13281 feet of casing below the capping stack containing a column of fluid whose hydrostatic pressure accounts for the 4089 psi discrepancy between the differential gauge reading and the differential formation pressure reading. 4089 / 13281 = .307883443 psi per foot X 19.23 = 5.92 ppg is what is the density of whatever mixture of oil and methane is in that shut in casing right now, based on the original undepleted formation pressure, and that figure would be lower for whatever has been the depletion of the formation since the blowout, which could be considerable. That is a specific gravity or density figure of .7092 g/ml for the metric value average for what is in the casing.

The figure for the mud weight being used by the relief well is not a good baseline figure to be using for referencing as a good indicator of actual formation pressure, as the relief well crew are probably overbalancing their mud ( and who can blame them ) . So anyway, these
numbers are probably more realisitic after cutting through all the fog of war kind of stuff and just taking a hard look at the probably better numbers, reviewing this is something
I am sure a few folks here will help me out with. You fellows keep me honest.

Given these more sensible numbers I am going to probably amend my earlier estimate of the pressure range where will be the peak because these more realistic numbers show a lower range, and less methane than was previously thought to be involved although there is still plenty of methane and it probably wouldn't hurt to bleed a little of it off.
It would be an interesting test which could resolve questions about what they have in the upper casing to crack the choke open a bit and see what comes out and when any change occurs, and proceed from there.
Keith-I have absolutely no idea what you talk about most of the time-but we do not overbalance mud wt ever that I have seen. We walk the fine line that the formations make us walk...always on the verge of taking a kick and fracturing a formation. On most wells equivalent circulating density is the final pressure that contains the gas- when the pump are off you get a small kick-after every connection, after every trip-you have trip gas or connection gas at bottoms up pump strokes. This is when you know you have the well balanced.

We never run more mud wt than is needed-it risks fracturing the formation and its slows rate of penetration. As for "bleeding it off a little"-please explain how you would do this without letting an additional bubble in the well?

As for the rest of your post I have no idea what you are talking about.

The lady with the highest IQ recorded in the world once said something like this...

"the purpose of language is to communicate with others-if you purposely keep trying to talk over their heads then you are not near as smart as you think you are"

Just paraphrasing but she said it much better...is there any way you can condense your post so some guy with a high school education could understand you? That would really impress me...
Sorry for not being more lucid. I have been reviewing all the figures for a couple of days and identified two discrepancies that caused me to have to redo all the figures, because of the difference for the 14.2 ppg mud and the 12.6 ppg mud that was showing as the pore pressure on the wellbore schematic. 14.2 ppg skews all the figures, while using the 12.6 ppg for calculations, it was finding the key to making better sense of the well.
A contractor friend in the industry who has been following this discussion e-mailed me about the pore pressure being 12.6 ppg and also about the pressure reading of 6800 psi that BP has published is an absolute pressure not a subsea differential pressure. Those two things in combination substantially change the picture (for the better) for controlling and / or killing the well in terms of the mechanics involved.

About the bleeding off of methane, the influx ratio at the bottom is possibly flow rate dependant, and if the flow is very very slow, less methane may come in at the bottom than is venting away at the top. I still think there is a mixed phase flow but I believe finessing a very very slow flow rate may clean it up. And cracking the choke open very slightly to see what comes out just seems to be a valid idea. It likely won't hurt anything and it could provide useful information as a test.

I am attaching the wellbore schematic again here if you look in the bottom left panel on the schematic in bright blue print you will see what I mean about the 12.6 ppg pore pressure that is one of the discrepancy figures that changes things. It is probably a good number that was carefully determined by the DWH.
Attachments:
Kieth I hope you understand the Pore Pressure is an estimate at best. Leo McClure and Eugene Penebaker, are pretty much the "Godfathers" of Pore Pressure on the Gulf Coast, they spent entire careers plotting, charting, and trying to get a grasp on Pore Pressure prediction. The majority of reliable DXC overlays, used in the industry for the Gulf Region, were drawn up, by Leo and Eugene. Conductivity/Gamma correlation prediction method is the brain child of Leo and Ralph Baird. And both of them will tell you, that all they try to do is keep you in the ballpark. Pore Pressure prediction is in no way an absolute science. The minute you think you have a grasp on the trend, the faulted sedimentary bowels of the GOM come and let you know you truly have no clue.

I can with out a doubt say with the utmost confidence, that they were drill no more than a half pound overbalance at any one time. That's the way you have to drill this area, right on the edge. There are so many thief zones that you have to juggle back and forth to stay just ahead of being on choke, without blowing the bottom out. Why do you think there are so many liners? Just because they like spending money on casing? Because there are so many sub normal and abnormal transitions to deal with, you rock along until you think you have the zone covered, and get it behind steel wall-cake and head off into the next unknown. It's all dark below the flow-line chief, and if was easy and predictable, everyone would be doing it. I have drilled all over the world, and nowhere is more challenging than the GOM. Here's just a sample of how the gulf coast can run you all over the place, chasing pore pressure. A general rule of thumb when you drill, and this goes for anywhere in the world, is this; Geologists and Geophysicists get you in the ball park with offsets and sonic logs, but in the absence of accurate and reliable 2D-SIVA curves, you are on your own, and you always no matter what let the wellbore tell you what mud weight you need to be running. The Macondo was an exploratory well for that section of MC-252. There wasn't a lot of data to work with. So just know that no matter what anyone is showing for pore pressure in the MC-252 Macondo well, it's a guess at best. Because not only were they drilling with 14.1 mud and still maintaining background and connection gases, they were also carrying probably around 1.2 ppg ECD bump as well, so while pumping their ECD total was closer to 15.3 ppg. So put that in your pipe and smoke it as well.

Thanks Mark for the good information. I did not know that the pore pressure was not measured but calculated by a formula. So that number could be off considerably from what is the actual formation pressure. It makes sense really that the balance for needed circulation rate and mud weight would be affected by viscosity, porosity of the formation, and pumping pressure along with actual formation pressure since they are all interacting, so there would have to be a constant adjusting, tuning the process by observation to keep the drilling progressing. The proof would be in the pudding more than the numbers because of the dynamic system where many factors are interacting. So the discrepancy for the pore pressure is not something that is telling. Okay I can believe that. Do you know about the "overbalance" that is charted as being there for the riser on that macondo well layout xls document, is that another estimated or calculated value that is necessary to be interpreted to mean something different from what it looks like, an approximation or estimate as opposed to an exact figure, as I am trying to reconcile the numbers to get a more accurate idea of what the actual formation pressure is. If you have been following this then you understand the dilemma, oil is not so viscous or dense, and it is entering what is a smooth steel liner on a one way trip, so we are trying to strip away all the variables involving the drilling fluids and get a good number for what the oil is doing. If they were following what you say and keeping to a half pound maximum overbalance then would you guess that the actual pore pressure is closer to 13.6 than to 12.6 ?
Keith,
In the wellbore schematic you just posted, at the bottom on the left side it states that the pore pressure is 12.6 or 12.8 ppg....forget exactly which. If you look at the bottom right of the same drawing, in the bottom right corner, it states that the pore pressure is 12.5-13.9ppg.

Let me suggest the one in blue on the left is a pre-drilling section estimate. That's my only thought. I'd put more credence on the bottom right figures, as they are probably estimates from mud logs taken while drilling and observing gas as drilled.

I can virtually promise you that they did not have this well overbalanced by @ 1.5ppg. If they had been able to do that, we wouldn't be having this conversation. I can make a better case for the actual pore pressure being slightly higher than 14.2 ppg, when you figure in ECD.

I've been on them before where you could circulate all day long with minimal gas, but every minute the pump was off the hole, you had influx and it would evidence itself quite clearly when you got bottoms up from any shutdown.

Just my thoughts.

Deeper
Thanks, I did see and wondered about those range numbers on the right.
I was looking at that range and trying to make sense of what the good pore pressure number really is, and I thought the 12.6 ppg on the left was what was the sweet spot in that range. I didn't know it was a projected number. So a better number for the pore pressure could be the higher end of the range on the right panel 13.9 ppg. But if you look at the panel just above that where they were approaching the formation horizon, they were at 13.9 ppg pore pressure. That has me thinking that maybe the lower number is good if they were balanced or overbalanced above the formation, but the porosity in the deeper reserve formation could cause a lower number. Is that possible? It could be 13.9 ppg dropping to 12.5 ppg in the actual formation ? Could the geology account for that if there was a layer of less porous harder rock over the dome, and they were drilling into a more porous formation of the reserve? Is it possible when they drilled into the reserve they encountered an outflow of the 13.9 ppg mud, rather than a kick ?
"Somewhere" I read that they lost +/- 3,000 bbsl of +/- 14.2 ppg SOBM (synthetic oil based mud) in the final drilled interval.

That's why I can state with some authority that pore pressure was somewhere around 14.2 ppg. Possibly higher as I have reason to think they were riding ECD to get a "feel good feeling"......

According to Congressional testimony, they did not circulate bottoms up after running the tapered production string.... maybe it was a time consideration....I suggest it was gonna take a LONG time to get bottoms up because bottoms up was gonna be ugly, and I think here, more than any other place, they rolled the dice.

They bet 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10........
and the 7 came face up.....but I digress.......

Do all the math we want, we have to look at the facts. They reported lost circulation with 14+ ppg mud. Betcha' they tried less mud wt and got their azz kicked even more.

I don't know if I'm the only company man/consultant who's ever been in this situation, but I've been there. When you have so many hydraulic constrictions in the annulus, you can create "instant mud weight" by increasing the pump rate. Anybody ever done that just long enough to get a nap??????

Deeper.......zzzzzzzzzzzzzzz
Deeper, If you run across where you were reading about that mud loss late in the DWH drilling, please share it because it could be useful information.

"Instant weight" from pumping would balance a kick, but would make a mud loss worse. This is something which seems contradictory to me about the mud loss and my understanding of what you are saying. It seems like to me that if there is mud loss caused by a resultant overbalancing of the mud weight from drilling into a more porous formation causing outflow of the mud into the formation, the cure for that mud loss would be making the mud lighter to get back to balance and stop the mud loss. If they had a mud loss then making the mud heavier should make the problem worse. Is that right ? And 3,000 barrels sounds like a lot of mud loss, is that a lot, or is that about normal for only needing a small adjustment in the mud weight ? Is a 3,000 barrel loss of 14.2 ppg mud a big enough loss to suggest a difference comparable to an imbalance that would correspond to a need for much lighter mud like even as light as 12.6 ppg mud to correct the balance and stop the mud loss ?

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