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Drilling Ahead

World Oilfield Forum

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Explosion-A Discussion of What Actually Happened?

 I will start the discussion with this which came in email a moment ago...

Anybody with any thoughts?


April 26, 2010       Transocean
Rig Disaster: The Well From Hell

Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more. Here's another update on the disaster that befell Transocean Ltd. and BP last week in the Gulf of Mexico.
(Thanks to OI reader Steve, in Texas, for sending some of the photos in today’s alert.)

As you know by now, the drilling vessel Deepwater Horizon exploded, burned and sank last week, with the loss of 11 workers and injuries to many more. What happened? What's happening now? What's going to happen? I've spent the weekend working to piece things together.

An Ill-fated Discovery
According to news accounts, at about 10 p.m. CDT last Tuesday, Deepwater Horizon was stable, holding an exact position in calm, dark seas about 45 miles south of the Louisiana coastline. Water depth in the area is 5,000 feet. The vessel manifest listed 126 souls on board.

Deepwater Horizon was finishing work on an exploration well named Macondo, in an area called Mississippi Canyon Block 252. After weeks of drilling, the rig had pushed a bit down over 18,000 feet, into an oil-bearing zone. The Transocean and BP personnel were installing casing in the well. BP was going to seal things up, and then go off and figure out how to produce the oil -- another step entirely in the oil biz.

The Macondo Block 252 reservoir may hold as much as 100 million barrels. That's not as large as other recent oil strikes in the Gulf, but BP management was still pleased. Success is success --
certainly in the risky, deep-water oil environment. The front office of BP Exploration was preparing a press release to announce a "commercial" oil discovery.

This kind of exploration success was par for the course for Deepwater Horizon. A year ago, the vessel set a record at another site in the Gulf, drilling a well just over 35,000 feet and discovering the 3 billion barrel Tiber deposit for BP. SoDeepwater Horizon was a great rig, with a great crew and a superb record. You might even say that is was lucky.

But perhaps some things tempt the Gods. Some actions may invite ill fate. Because suddenly, the wild and wasteful ocean struck with a bolt from the deep.

The Lights Went out;
and Then.
.. 

Witnesses state that the lights flickered on the Deepwater Horizon. Then a massive thud shook the vessel, followed by another strong vibration. Transocean employee Jim Ingram, a seasoned
offshore worker, told the U.K. Times that he was preparing for bed after working a 12-hour shift. "On the second [thud]," said Mr. Ingram, "we knew something was wrong." Indeed, something was very wrong.

Within a moment, a gigantic blast of gas, oil and drilling mud roared up through three miles of down-hole pipe and subsea risers. The fluids burst through the rig floor and ripped up into the gigantic draw-works. Something sparked. The hydrocarbons ignited. In a fraction of a second, the drilling deck of the Deepwater Horizon exploded into a fireball. The scene was an utter conflagration.

Transocean Deepwater Horizon Listing

Evacuate and Abandon
Ship 


There was almost no time to react. Emergency beacons blared. Battery-powered lighting switched on throughout the vessel. Crew members ran to evacuation stations. The order came to abandon ship.
Then from the worst of circumstances came the finest, noblest elements of human behavior. Everyone on the vessel has been through extensive safety training. They knew what to do. Most crew members climbed into covered lifeboats. Other crew members quickly winched the boats, with their shipmates, down to the water. Then those who stayed behind rapidly evacuated in other designated emergency craft.

Some of the crew, however, were trapped in odd parts of the massive vessel, which measures 396 feet by 256 feet -- a bit less than the size of two football fields laid side by side.( This is one big
Drill Ship) They couldn't get to the boats. So they did what they had to do, which for some meant jumping -- and those jumpers did not fare so well. Several men broke bones due to the impact of their 80-foot drop to the sea. Still, it beat burning.

With searchlights providing illumination, as well as the eerie light from the flames of the raging fire, boat handlers pulled colleagues out of the water beneath the burning rig. In some instances, the plastic fittings on the lifeboats melted from the heat.

The flames intensified.
Soon it was impossible for the lifeboats to function near the massive vessel. The small boats moved away from the raging fountain of fire fed by ancient oil and gas from far below.

Transocean Horizon Burning At Night

The lifeboat skippers saved as many as they could find -- 115 -- but couldn't account for 11 workers who were, apparently, on or around the drill deck at the time of the first explosion. Nine of the missing are Transocean employees. Two others work for subcontractors.

Damon
Bankston to the Rescue 


Fate was not entirely cruel that night. Indeed, a supply boat was already en route to the Deepwater
Horizon. It was the Tidewater Damon Bankston, a 260-foot long flat-deck supply vessel.

Damon Bankston heard the distress signal. Her captain did what great captains do. He aimed the bow toward the position of Deepwater Horizon. Then he tore through the water, moved along by four mighty Caterpillar engines rated at 10,200 horsepower. Soon, the Damon Bankston arrived on scene,
sailed straight into the flames and joined the rescue.

Meanwhile, Coast Guard helicopters lifted off from pads in southern Louisiana, and Coast Guard
rescue vessels left their moorings. "You have to go out," is the old Coast Guard saying. "You don't have to come back."

The helicopters flew in the black of night toward a vista of utter disaster. Arriving on scene, the pilots watched in awe as columns of flame shot as high as a 50-story building. The helicopters were buffeted by blasts of super-heated wind coming from the flames, while chunks of soot the size of your hand blew by.

The pilots hovered in the glow of the blazing rig, while Coast Guard medics fast-roped down to the deck of Damon Bankston . The medics quickly assessed the casualties, strapped critically injured crewmen to backboards and hoisted them up to the helicopters. Then the pilots turned north and sped ashore to hospitals.

Uninjured survivors returned to land on the Damon Bankston. And others came out to fight
the blistering flames.

But the Deepwater Horizon wasn't going to make it. The situation deteriorated, to the point of complete catastrophe. The ship was lost.

Transocean Horizon On Fire Sinking

At about 10 a.m. CDT on Thursday morning, 36 hours after the first explosion, the Deepwater Horizon capsized and sank in 5,000 feet of water. According to BP, the hulk is located on the
seafloor, upside-down, about 1,500 feet away from the Macondo well it drilled.

Still Spilling Oil 
On Friday, I told you that the oil well drilled by the Deepwater Horizon was sealed in. The "official" word was that the well wasn't gushing oil into the sea. My sources were no less than U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry, of the New Orleans district, as quoted in The New York Times. 

But over the weekend, Rear Adm. Landry and The New York Times reported that the well IS leaking oil, at a rate of about 1,000 barrels per day.

The on-scene information comes from remotely operated underwater robots that BP and Transocean are using to monitor the well and survey all the other wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon. There's now a large amount of equipment and pipe and a myriad of marine debris on the seafloor near the well. It's a mess.

Apparently, the blowout preventer is not controlling the flow of oil. According to Transocean, the blowout preventer on Deepwater Horizon was manufactured by Cameron Intl. (CAM: NYSE). 

What happened? We don't know that just yet. Earlier reports that underwater robots sealed the blowout preventer were wrong. It's possible that the blowout preventer is only partially closed. We'll find out, eventually. Meanwhile, BP and Transocean have announced that they will make another effort to activate the blowout preventer. They need to stop that oil.

BP is also preparing to drill one or more relief wells to secure the site permanently. BP has mobilized the drilling rig Development Driller III, which is moving into position to drill a second well to intercept the leaking well. With the new well, the drillers will inject a specialized heavy fluid into the original well. This fluid will secure and block the flow of oil or gas and allow BP to permanently seal the first well.

Riser Problems? 

According to the Coast Guard and BP, oil is leaking from two spots along what is left of the riser system. Here's a schematic view:

Transocean Horizon Sea Floor Diagram

Originally, the risers (represented by the blue line in the graphic above) were affixed to the blowout preventer on the seafloor, and extended 5,000 feet straight up to the "moon pool" of the Deepwater Horizon. When the drilling vessel sank, it took the riser piping and bent it around like a pretzel.

The remnants of the riser system now follow a circuitous underwater route. According to BP, the risers extend from the wellhead up through the water column to about 1,500 feet above the seabed.
Then the riser system buckles back down toward the seafloor. (Frankly, I'm astonished that it all held together as well as it has. It's a credit to the manufacturer, which I'll discuss below.)

According to the Transocean website, the riser devices on the Deepwater Horizonwere manufactured by VetcoGray, a division of General Electric Oil & Gas. The specific designation is a "HMF-Class H, 21-inch outside diameter riser; 90 foot long joints with Choke & Kill, and booster and hydraulic  supply lines."

Here's a photo of something similar. These are Vetco risers sections that I saw on another vessel, the Transocean Discoverer Inspiration, when I visited that ship last month:

Transocean Horizon Riser Sections

The different color stripes on the risers indicate differing amounts of buoyancy. The idea is to put heavy riser pipe down at the bottom, connected to more buoyant risers above. The buoyancy
keeps the entire riser system in more or less neutral buoyancy, so that the drill ship doesn't have to somehow hoist up the huge weight of all that pipe.

As you can see, there's a large-diameter pipe in the middle of each riser. That pipe is then encased in a buoyant foam substance. The risers are bolted together at the flange sections. The bolts are about as big as the arm of a very strong man. The nuts, which tighten things down, are the size of paint cans.

After the risers are assembled and hanging down from the drilling vessel, the drilling personnel lower and raise drilling pipe through the large-diameter center riser pipe. All the drilling mud stays inside the drill pipe on the way down hole, and inside the riser pipe on the return.

On the side of the riser sections, you can see smaller-diameter pipes. These are choke & kill, booster and hydraulic pipe components. The pipes run parallel to the large-diameter inner pipe. These pipe systems run down to the blowout preventer on the seafloor.

The idea is to keep the drilling process an enclosed system. All the "drilling stuff" -- the drill-pipe, drilling-mud and drill-cutting returns -- stays inside the large-diameter pipe. The smaller pipes
hold fluid to transmit hydraulic power and help control drilling. In particular, the pipes on the side aid in communicating with and controlling the blowout preventer.

Technical Specs 

Ideally, when the risers are working as intended, nothing leaks out into the sea. Then again, you're not supposed to twist and bend the riser sections like a pretzel. So how strong is a riser
system? Extremely strong, actually.

According to technical literature from GE Oil & Gas, the riser equipment is "designed for use in
high-pressure, critical service and deep-water drilling and production applications." The pressure-containing components are rated for working pressures of 15,000 psi. That's the same as the Cameron blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon. The materials used in risers have
exceptional tensile and bending load characteristics.

According to Vetco paperwork that I've seen, the Class H riser sections have a 3.5 million pound
load-carrying capacity. That's the equivalent weight of about four fully fueled
Boeing 747s. These risers are super strong.

Still, it's not just any one single piece of riser section that does it all. These sections all get bolted
together, for 5,000 feet in this case. The riser sections all have to work together as a system. The whole string is only as strong as the weakest spot. And yes, even the strongest steel will break if you apply enough stress.

It all has to work together. You've got the riser sections, along with things called HMF flanged riser connectors. Then there are HMF riser joints; flex joints; telescopic joints; and, near the top, things called "fluid-bearing, nonintegral tensioner rings." Together, these all comprise the marine riser system.

In general, the riser components compensate for heave, surge, sway, offset and torque of the drilling vessel as the ship bounces around on the sea surface. The bottom line is to maintain a tight seal -- what's called "integrity" -- between the subsea blowout preventer stack and the surface
during drilling operations.

Down at the bottom, at the seafloor, the risers are connected to the blowout preventer by a connector device. The GE-Vetco spec is for a device that accommodates 7 million foot-pounds of bending
load capacity. That's about eight fully fueled Boeing 747s.

What's the idea? You want a secure connection between the high-pressure wellhead system and
the subsea blowout preventer stack. That's where mankind's best steel meets Mother Nature's high pressures.

High pressures? You had better believe it. And in this case, Mother Nature won. So looking forward, there's going to be a lot of forensic engineering on the well design and how things got monitored
during drilling. Transocean drilled the well, but BP designed it. So the key question is how did the down-hole pressures get away like they did?

What Happens
Now? 


It's a good thing that the Deepwater Horizon didn't settle right on top of the well. At least there's room for the remotely operated vehicles to maneuver. Also, there's still a lot of riser still floating in the water column. So there's some element of integrity going down to the blowout preventer.

It's absolutely imperative to shut off that oil flow. We just have to hope and pray that the BP and Transocean people can get the blowout preventer shut off. Or that there's enough integrity to the risers somehow to get in there and control the leaks, perhaps with some sort of plug. One other idea is to lower a large "hood" over the leak and capture the oil so it can be pumped up to a storage tanker ship.

Meanwhile, the relief well has to go down -- carefully and safely. This Macondo well is history. Seal it. Mark it. Give it back to the sea. Move on. Don't tempt fate on this
one. And wow... for a relatively modest-sized deep-water discovery, this
thing sure has turned into the well from hell.

Welcome to the World of Deep-water Risk 

As I've said before, this accident is Mother Nature's wake-up call to everyone. Deep-water drilling is a high-stakes game. It's not exactly a "casino," in that there's a heck of a lot of settled science,
engineering and technology involved.  But we're sure finding out the hard way what all the risks are. And it's becoming more and more clear how the totality of risk is a moving target. There's geologic risk, technical risk, engineering risk, environmental risk, capital risk and market risk.


With each deep well, these risks all come together over one very tiny spot at the bottom of the ocean. So for all the oil that's out there under deep water -- and it's a lot -- the long-term calculus of risk and return is difficult to quantify.

There's more to discuss, but I'll end here today. I'll update you as things evolve. This is big news all through the offshore industry. There are HUGE environmental issues, and certainly big political repercussions. I won't go there just now. For now, I'll just send out collective best wishes to the people at Transocean, BP, the Coast Guard, Minerals Management and so many more. I'm sure they're doing their best.

Thanks for reading...

(Name Withheld)

Tags: Transocean, cause, deepwater, discussion, explosion, happened, horizon, what

Views: 10018

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Replies to This Discussion

Talk of a Static Kill now , possible in a few days which I do not think will happen-or if it does I doubt it will be successful. Apparently BP is saying it has not been thought possible in the past week because they expected 8000psi of pressure and the BOP equipment-lines,etc could not withstand this pressure without rupturing. Now that the pressure is 6800 and slowing rising they say they now think its possible.
To me, this has really got crazy. I have been BP's biggest supporter in this forum but I am losing faith as i believe this has now become about limiting liability and the President playing politics to the public. Everyone now serving their own agenda instead of the protecting environment.

With that said I will also add that I believe they have already caused an underground blowout and that the oil and gas is escaping into the weaker zones above and slowly filling the porous zones above. Everyone in the public and the media seems to be under the impression that underground blowouts reach the surface and nothing could be farther from the truth. This oil & gas could be in a cross flow and never reach the surface. Disaster will be magnified if it does so keeping my fingers crossed.

I believe 1 thing is certain-keeping this well closed is purely political and is going to make a kill from the relief well much more difficult. I think this will become evident when they attempt any kill method and find the volume of mud needed to kill this will be much more than expected.

With only "driller" experience here as a "brakeweight" I am the least qualified of all those in the industry that post here. I have been disappointed that more "drillers" are not posting with us on this topic-but at the same time I am greatly appreciative for all of you with so much knowledge sharing it here and politely keeping me straight You guys are some of the best in the industry and the cream of the crop.

Thanks for patiently let me and others like me join you in this discussion.

Oh...I wanted to share this great link with everyone on Underground Blowouts
Curtis, I have watched many consultants, directional drillers, OIM, pushers, etc, voice their opinion on this topic. Yours has always been a voice of reason & experience. As a former consultan, dd, pusher, & driller, I can say that I wish that more folks like you had joined in. I responded a couple of times & was stiffly rebuked by those who KNOW. LOL. Thanks Curtis for all your input. It has been dead on since the start of this fiasco. Your friend, Jim Bural.
Although we should not, in the workplace we tend to be a bit shy about asking questions concerning other people's disciplines in case we show ignorance. Sites like this should let us ask these questions and learn more.
One thing I always stress to anyone I work with, or students I am instructing, there is one one bad question, and that's the one you didn't ask. Learning is just a part of life, and if a day goes by that you didn't learn something new, that was a day wasted.....

Curtis they (BP) are being pulled in nine different directions. They have DOE pressuring them to do one thing, think tank rats to do others, and the only common since bunch in the mix, sitting on their hands, because they are afraid to speak out, because before it's over, anyone and everyone that made a bad call or had an idea that didn't workout as expected, is going to be scapegoated to should some of the blame and possibly liability of this nightmare. Internal BP people won't be attacked financially, other than maybe losing their jobs, but consultants and contractors will reap the wrath of the ambulance chasers that are already lined up to jump on this with both feet.
John, Theoretical models are used to guess answers about things you can't measure directly. Using an idealized model that is somewhere near to believabale in calculations to guess actual formation pressure that is the "best case scenario" for the lowest feasible actual formation pressure is where I was going with the pore pressure calculations involving the "magic mud" of 12.6 ppg as an adjusted theoretical value matching the pore pressure calculations. The results of that theoretical model establish a kind of lower limit for what would be a feasible formation pressure you were asking about in your first post. If you do the calculations involving the actual mud weight that was used, by direct calculations you get a much higher number that doesn't take variables into account. An average between the values gotten for those two methods can give a better idea of what is a more feasible figure for the formation pressure. You can't really come up with a good pressure figure by simple arithmetic because that doesn't allow for the variables involving what mud weight needed to be used as a practical matter. Mud that is viscous and in a loop circulation being cut by drilling debris and gas as a matter of course is a different physical system entirely from oil making a one way trip upwards through the same pipes. It is difficult to try to get a good theoretical model which accounts for the variables and translates the figures derived during drilling into figures that apply to the production observed later. Much easier that would be if there was some metering and good figures now on what the production of the well is, but like Tex was saying, evidently BP does not want telling numbers known. Unfortunately those same numbers have bearing in the "plausible scenario" calculations done to evaluate the well. We only have some of the data needed for better modeling and they are keeping it that way.
Thanks for the link Curtis. They say that gas 2 miles away is coming from an old P&A well. I hope they set some good plugs in that well. Just a thought & probably nothing related to this.
Not to mention that the US guv'mint has already announced their intention to make them pay royalties on every drop of excaped oil.

Looking for that link right now....think it was in RigZone....any help would be appreciated finding it.

Deeper
Hey after reading all these posts plus being out of the patch for awhile. I didnt realize how retarded i really was from my derrickmans position on the drilling aspect (laymans) i had the understanding as long as the mudweight goin in was the same as the mudweight comin out!!!Following mudmans protocol......add barite for weight add bentonite (gel) for visciosty.add other chemicals for mud control lignite, caustic and polymers..You could look at your mud and tell by the swirl and the shine if it was good to go.!.... One thing i had a hard time rackin my brain around was (i now now) was how come it took 2000lbs of barite to raise the total mudweight ONE pound. Also Keith Jones no disrespect i admire your knowledge but dammit Jim you lost me man!!! Keith could you consolidate and translate to roughneck.....hah lol...
I have a new found respect for my toolpusher we thought while on those 110 degree days trippin pipe he was sittin in his trailer watchin cartoons. To be honest back in the day id of rather been trippin pipe then trying to decipher these situations. We just would handle the situations as they came ...... I understand their is a reason for this technology but someone should comeup with a roughhneck app for my I-phone...
You think I'm confusing. I just tried to grope my way through a 125 page doctoral dissertation written by a (I think) Greek lady at Stanford 30 years ago, and the Horner curve that BP is also (I think) probably using for pressure prediction is from 60 years ago. I am not even posting that technical stuff here as it gives me a headache to read it. Sufficient to say the arithmetic gets complicated quick and it isn't just mud weight and viscosity and depth, but formation porosity, and a half dozen other variables that make the actual pressure appear differently in the reverse production flow direction compared to what you would guess from the drilling data. It is apples and oranges. Getting just a little bit into it is way far enough for me. Anyway I was just trying to get some ballpark feasible parameters settled in my mind. This is one of those areas they have been working on for a hundred years and are still working on it, with papers still coming out recently. I can't even read some of it much less understand it. So , let me just agree again with what Tex said.
Keith, why don't you ask Curtis to give you a dollar per word?

--Then take the rest of us out for a steak & lobster dinner.
Mankind! @ $1 per word I could cure world hunger!
Actually I am having some business cards printed up ,

Have Wiregun - Will Travel

Top Kills , Middle Kills , Bottom Kills .....
we kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out

Shoe shines and shaves, cigars and beers while you wait
Hospitality ladies above saloon. Piano requests welcome .

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