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Transocean Investigation Results-Do You Agree With These Findings?

 

Several new files today to share (at least new to me) and I am adding them below. Several investigations into the Deepwater Horizon tragedy with many ideas and conclusions as to all the different causes of this tragedy. I am really amazed at what all was wrong with the BOPs in these findings! Scary stuff. To those of you following this discussion I am looking forward to your remarks as to if you agree with these conclusions (hard not to) and what do you feel about the new future changes in deepwater drilling that are sure to occur?

Deepwater Horizon Investigation

Boots And Coots Macondo Findings

Report Summary & Recommendations

Effects & New Regulations Are We Ready?

Here is an unrelated file also concerning another blowout

Montera Montana Blowout Findings

All of these files and more are available for download form our File Center

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Interesting reading, thanks. Although I know NOTHING about this profession, it seems odd an experienced crew weren't more concerned with the pressures rising rather than dropping.

A question: when a production rig hooks up, drills out the cement plug, how do they control the pressure? I don't see how they can use mud to control it and still get oil out. Do they take the BOP off and use some sort of heavy duty valve?

Thanks
One question:
What were the Pop-Off (Relief) Valves set at on the Mud Pumps?

Looks like they could have went to me allowing blow back into the mud pit's and mud pump areas...and this could have actually caused some of the problems noted...
Normally on these rigs their pop offs would be set at 7,000 to 7,500 PSI. I believe that Trans ocean started using a rupture disc type pop off a few years ago. They are using 14p-2200 ( 14 inch stroke, normally 6" pistons with 2200 available horse-power mud pumps with 7,500 psi fluid ends and on these wells their drilling pressures are most likely between 6,000 and 6,600 psi.
Last D/Pipe pressure noted on charts was 5700 psi...maximum pressure National 14P2200 with 6" liners = 6285 psi...most likely they were set at 6000 psi even 5800 psi? Pressure was increasing on drill pipe @ approx 2800 psi per minute...it blew the rupture disc most likely and that was one of the loud explosions or thumps they heard?
When BP finally capped the well the pressure went to...6400 psi initial before building to 6800 psi final pressure?...after the well has flowed for 2 months and reservoir pressure dropped...it was calculated at 7200 psi SITP initially if I remember correctly when they capped it...it didn't go to 7200 psi and they were worried about a leak...more than likely the reservoir depleted to 6800 psi SITP...

Just saying I would like to know what they were set at...because more than likely they blew...

"20 Apr 2010 21:49 Explosion occurs. Data lost. Last pressure reading
was 5700 psi."


Pressure readings via computer satellite are delayed at minimum 30 secs...pressure on drill pipe was rising at approx 2800 psi/min...
Additional they must have drilled 8-1/2" hole? or 9-7/8" hole? as they ran a 9-7/8" X 7" Production Casing String...the previous casing was 11-7/8"...
The 8-1/2" hole would have only required 500 gpm to clean of course 650 gpm would be better...BUT with losses/ballooning issues the ECD would have been the most critical issue they were facing with 14.1 ppg SBM, so the high gpm and high pump pressure was not even a factor, as they had to keep flow rate low to keep from losing mud and/or ballooning...
I really appreciate Shell Oil President's remark: "It's not a well we would drill" more like "It's a well we couldn't drill"...lol...they tried drilling the Nkanda (HPHT) here in Nigeria and gave it up and plugged back...Total tried Nkanda also...they allowed ExxonMobil to go in with Mobil Drilling Supv's and successfully drilled and tested...
I have read the B.P report they are pointing the finger everywhere but at themseleves.
Paul what is your point? What do you deduct? That it is 100% BP's fault? Transocean did their job? Correct Basic Well Control Procedures were followed by the Transocean Crew?

I would sincerely like to understand...
I did not say it was all of B.P's fault I said they are pointing the finger everywhere but at themselves read my post again.
Looks as if the truth is still not what people want to hear? The drill crew allowed the well to come in on that them unchecked, simple as that, you must ALWAYS be ready to execute well control regardless of whom you are working for or whereever you are at...ALWAYS be ready...
I learned that 30 yrs ago and have never let it get away...always thinking about each well and how it could possibly get underbalanced and kick on me and then how I will handle it...everyone in this industry must take this to heart or there will be many more "horizons"...
BP was not responsible for first line defense/rig floor well control...the drill crew is ultimately responsible and the "first line" defense...if they don't respond then why would it be someone else's responsibility that is not on the drill floor?
If the BP Rep had been on the floor with them BP would have still stated what they did in this report...would they not?
Cole I agree %100 we are always told to shut in the well then answer questions later. It seems there was a serious breakdown in commucation here. If it's true what was told about the subsea eng. wanting to shut in the well on the bridge but was told not to someone did not have proper training me I would have closed the door. All due respect to Transocean your men needs more and or better training in well control.
Well said Paul...in the last few years I have killed several short blowouts that Transocean did not shut in and failed to reconize the "red flags"...it is sad when a DSV is sitting in his office and has to call the rig floor and tell the Toolpusher to shut the well in it is flowing...
Twice I have done this once to the tune of a 93 bbl kick during a connection AFTER I told the Driller to CBU and flowcheck prior to making a connection...he "forgot"...
Another one the well stated blowing and the Toolpusher was standing in front of the BOP Panel and only had to turn around and actuate the BOP...he ran out of the doghouse door...I closed the well in myself...4000 psi on the choke...he said he had went to check the choke manifold...?

And several more...I guess the most disheartening thing is a couple of these that blew...was when I did get the TP to close the well they would forget (or were so nervous) to turn off the mudpumps that were running at 600 gpm...that really hurts, but I shut them off on both occassions before the Annular closed

But I understand I have worked all sides of this game...I have had Comp Rep and a TP try and get me to open a well after I took a kick and I had called them to the rig floor...they didn't believe there was a kick in the hole with 400 psi on the casing and 0 psi on the drill pipe (Had a slug in the pipe)...I told them "no problem" I'll be on the heliport....you go ahead and open it...and I walked off the floor...

We have to be willing to do that at anytime and not make decisions based upon peer pressure...

You said the magic words...they need hands on training in well control...or they need people that have experience in this type of High Pressure environment...I did it for years and I learned from some of the best there is...

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