World Oilfield Forum
Attached are 22 pages that are extracted, bookmarked, highlighted (and commented) from the section of the BOEMRE report of 2011 that concerned cementing at the Macondo well. I was looking…Continue
Added by George Baker on July 24, 2014 at 10:21pm — No Comments
An 11-minute video by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board was released on June 5, 2014, based on a report that examined the reasons for the failure of the Macondo's BOP. The report finds that there was a buckling of the drill pipe that created a condition for which the BOP had not been designed. The report concludes that BOPs on other exploratory wells could be vulnerable to conditions similar to those found on April 20, 2010, at the Macondo well.
Added by George Baker on June 17, 2014 at 6:55pm — No Comments
Added by Kari on June 6, 2014 at 2:30pm — No Comments
This photo (taken with permission at the stand of Grupo R at OTC 2014) gives a suggestion of Grupo R's ambitions in the rig market.
I was interested in the governance of its 3 DW rigs. The company (Pemex) well supervisor is located in Villahermosa, and seldom visits the rig; instead,…Continue
Here is a title list of 4 years of reporting by Mexico Energy Intelligence (MEI) on the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo accident of 2010. Neither the government nor industry has taken ownership of the role of human error in the unfolding of that accident.
Evidence? People still talk about "Stop Work Authority," as if that notion had any credibility or relevance in matters of process safety. At the end of 2013, BSEE published a list of attributes of a "culture of safety," but…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 21, 2014 at 5:38am — No Comments
The MMS director at the time of Macondo (and who resigned within hours before her scheduled testimony to Congress) co-authors an essay that expresses concern that not enough has been done to implement the recommendations that came out of the investigation of the Macondo blow-out.
To judge from the presentations at the DECOM WORLD conference on Well Integrity Management Systems (April 15-16), quite a lot has been done to improve the operator's understanding and dashboard of key…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 17, 2014 at 4:13pm — No Comments
The 2-hour tour of Halliburton's Global Technology Center this afternoon convinced me that, by shaking (in all directions), baking (up to 400 degrees F) and pressurizing (to 40,000 psi), they try to break their tools in the lab. "We want a tool to break here, not in the field."
It was also interesting that they have blocks of known rock by which they can test a tool's calibrations prior to its use in the field.
Our group was told that there are 500 scientists at the…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 16, 2014 at 8:26pm — No Comments
At the DECOM WORLD conference this week on "Well Integrity" and WIMS, I asked the engineers: Why not add HSE metrics on your well dashboard to adjust for the (in)experience of the crew? It would serve as a kind of economic deflator; but you would have to quantify the skill level of the individuals or keep track of their "flight hours" as with pilots. I made copies available of the first page of my article on Macondo (the unmentionable ghost of which was in the subtext of most questions and…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 16, 2014 at 8:06pm — No Comments
Has anyone ever wondered about how it is that Transocean doesn't have a drilling contract in Mexico for deep and ultra-deep wells using its 6th generation semi-submersibles? Has anyone ever wondered how it is that a home-grown Mexican company, Grupo R, has three such semi's under contract with Pemex, despite no experience outside of Mexico or outside a Pemex contract?
In the course of preparing a report on the outlook for the implementation of the cross-border oil agreement that came…Continue
Added by George Baker on January 4, 2014 at 9:30pm — No Comments
What are your thoughts on having video on drilling rigs?
Do they change the safety culture?
Please comment only if you have experience with video.
Comments on it's what you breathe
I was in Nigeria for Camco, Now Shclumberger and was on a stimulation boat. We pumped a product supplied by Shell oil called EPO sand. I did not realize until later in life that it had damaged my liver. When I went to Nigeria, My cholesterol was below 200 I did not know what a triglyceride was. Now years later my cholesterol is 650 and my triglycerides are above 1700.
I have had one pancreatitis' attack and my prognosis is not good. I recently…Continue
Today being World Scleroderma Day, please take a moment to read and be aware. O/G workers have the highest risk of developing this according to government statistics due to exposure to silica dust. My mom got this disease from being nearby a tar roofing operation for several months. It is terribly painful, debilitating and has no cure and little to no treatment. Please take precautions on the job -or for those who aren't feeling well and aren't sure why- this is commonly missed or…Continue
I have heard rumors that some companies have established Cement Integrity Simulators, where teams can be trained in a series of what-if situations to help prepare them not to make the same mistakes as were made on DWH.
If so, I would regard such training as a very positive safety innovation that (indeed) may be traced back to Macondo.
Does anyone have any facts to share about such simulators? Or, are the rumors of such simulators mere simulations of post-Macondo safety…Continue
Added by George Baker on June 22, 2013 at 7:32am — No Comments
Had a argument with my Pusher about the proper way to pin our Derreck on the racking board side.
Please help me if you know?
What I now believe is that my question, which I've asked on several industry forums, What specific improvements in offshore safety can be specifically tied back to the causes of the Macondo incident?, is unanswerable. That is, given the number of lawyers in Houston, no IOC (or anyone else, including IHS) is going to want to go on record as giving an answer to this basic question.
So we are in the paradoxical situation of having so many safety glitches on Macondo, from an…Continue
The Joint Industry Task Forces (JITFs) that were established soon after the Macondo blowout were intended to convince regulators and the public that Industry was serious about improving safety and environmental standards.
Then a curious thing happened on the way to the bank . . . all the real and imagined lawsuits in the air meant that it would be unwise to speak about the CAUSES of the accident.
The stakeholders were cynically advised by their lawyers (or so one imagines) to…Continue
I attended the safety panel and presentations at OTC-2013 in the expectation of being able to write a report on the "Advances in Offshore Safety." Hmm. It hasn't worked out that way so far.
The blow-out, explosions and ensuing oil spill at the Macondo well in 2010 led to changes in the industry, both cosmetic and substantive. Of these, the American public knows only about the cosmetic ones, starting with changes in the names of agencies responsible for federal oversight of operators…Continue
At a two-hour, Mexican-style lunch today with a consulting geologist (retired eight years from Shell), I put up for our discussion the hypothetical distinction between a safety culture for drilling versus a safety culture for production. He observed that “the nature of the safety challenge changes daily—sometimes hourly—in drilling, whereas on a production platform the risks are evenly distributed, and every day is pretty much the same as the day before.”
We discussed (again) the…Continue
Added by George Baker on May 31, 2013 at 6:26pm — No Comments
Last night, reading over the 9 characteristics of a "robust safety culture," I had the sensation that they purpose was to convey the idea that had such a culture existed on DWH, the Macondo accident would have been prevented. I made a 2-column table in Excel: 1 column for the 9 points, the other for "Applicability to DWH." For all but one of the points (Continuous Improvement), I was able to identify a specific issue at DWH.
It's telling that BSEE makes a point of saying that it's not…Continue
On May 13, 2013, I had a long chat in the Galleria-area office of Charlie Williams, the executive director of the Center for Offshore Safety (whose earlier career had been with Shell). One of the topics that we discussed was whether or not the case could be made that there is a distinct safety culture that applies to offshore drilling, and another safety culture that applies to offshore production.
This distinction was raised at a session of OTC 2013 by Ian Sutton, a panelist,…Continue