World Oilfield Forum
Petroleum fiscal-system expert Pedro van Meurs released a 72-page critique--a vivisection--of the fiscal terms and rules of contract administration that are contained in the government’s Model Contract dated December 11, 2014. We made an index of his concerns in our report (http://bit.ly/1K2THm9). Operators, portfolio investors and drillers will want to pay close attention to these perceived deficiencies and the manner in which the authorities in Mexico…Continue
Added by George Baker on December 31, 2014 at 8:26pm — No Comments
We did a creative exercise of rewriting the energy history of Mexico since 1976 in the language of American football. It's easy to see that much of that history has been one of punts and fumbles, where the "punting" is kicking the hard policy decisions to the next presidential administration.
Having this history in mind is especially important now, when possibilities for fumbles on both sides are greater.
The link is to the title list of reports issued…Continue
Added by George Baker on November 28, 2014 at 6:05pm — No Comments
Procurement in Pemex (and the Mexican public sector in general) has been driven by the criterion of "lowest price," that is, the lowest bid price. The motivation behind this rigidity…Continue
Added by George Baker on October 5, 2014 at 11:28am — No Comments
If you know Spanish (and even if you don't), the video of the Pemex blow-out of the onshore well Chilapilla 43 is worth watching:
Added by George Baker on October 4, 2014 at 11:30am — No Comments
Just like throwing an object in to a pool of water the things we do effect those around us. Who would be effected if we were injured? Family? Coworkers? Friends? Who else? No one that cares for us wants to see us hurt. Depending on the severity of the injury, the ability to interact with our loved ones with all of our senses could be compromised. What if we could not work anymore and were unable to provide income for our families? How would their lifestyles change? How would creditors and…Continue
Judge Barbier's 153-page report did not consider the chain of events set in motion by the placement of the casing seal assembly just 17 minutes after the placement of cement.
Added by George Baker on September 5, 2014 at 6:22pm — No Comments
I encouraged the conference organizers to add to the program a speaker who will give a new explanation of the root cause of the Macondo accident: The short story is that the premature setting of the casing seal (just 17 minutes after the end of the cement job) set in motion a chain of thermodynamic reactions that soon induced formation flow while the cement was still a slurry.
One take-away lesson is that the cement must not be disturbed during the Wait-on-Cement (WOC) time;…Continue
Added by George Baker on August 28, 2014 at 8:30am — No Comments
The cited "Field Test 2" in the 2013 SPE/IADC paper entitled "Modeling Reveals Hidden Conditions that can Impair Wellbore Stability and Integrity" is actually about the Macondo well (an important detail that is hidden from the reader).
Speaking with one of the authors this morning, he recalled, "We wrote the paper in a way so that the lawyers who were still worried about liability wouldn't understand it. Otherwise, they wouldn't have let us publish the data."
Added by George Baker on August 26, 2014 at 2:11pm — No Comments
On the weekend before the promulgation of the Energy Reform today, there was a 3-day energy conference in Monterrey sponsored by the law school of the…Continue
Added by George Baker on August 11, 2014 at 2:01pm — No Comments
Attached are 22 pages that are extracted, bookmarked, highlighted (and commented) from the section of the BOEMRE report of 2011 that concerned cementing at the Macondo well. I was looking…Continue
Added by George Baker on July 24, 2014 at 10:21pm — No Comments
An 11-minute video by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board was released on June 5, 2014, based on a report that examined the reasons for the failure of the Macondo's BOP. The report finds that there was a buckling of the drill pipe that created a condition for which the BOP had not been designed. The report concludes that BOPs on other exploratory wells could be vulnerable to conditions similar to those found on April 20, 2010, at the Macondo well.
Added by George Baker on June 17, 2014 at 6:55pm — No Comments
Added by Kari on June 6, 2014 at 2:30pm — No Comments
This photo (taken with permission at the stand of Grupo R at OTC 2014) gives a suggestion of Grupo R's ambitions in the rig market.
I was interested in the governance of its 3 DW rigs. The company (Pemex) well supervisor is located in Villahermosa, and seldom visits the rig; instead,…Continue
Here is a title list of 4 years of reporting by Mexico Energy Intelligence (MEI) on the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo accident of 2010. Neither the government nor industry has taken ownership of the role of human error in the unfolding of that accident.
Evidence? People still talk about "Stop Work Authority," as if that notion had any credibility or relevance in matters of process safety. At the end of 2013, BSEE published a list of attributes of a "culture of safety," but…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 21, 2014 at 5:38am — No Comments
The MMS director at the time of Macondo (and who resigned within hours before her scheduled testimony to Congress) co-authors an essay that expresses concern that not enough has been done to implement the recommendations that came out of the investigation of the Macondo blow-out.
To judge from the presentations at the DECOM WORLD conference on Well Integrity Management Systems (April 15-16), quite a lot has been done to improve the operator's understanding and dashboard of key…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 17, 2014 at 4:13pm — No Comments
The 2-hour tour of Halliburton's Global Technology Center this afternoon convinced me that, by shaking (in all directions), baking (up to 400 degrees F) and pressurizing (to 40,000 psi), they try to break their tools in the lab. "We want a tool to break here, not in the field."
It was also interesting that they have blocks of known rock by which they can test a tool's calibrations prior to its use in the field.
Our group was told that there are 500 scientists at the…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 16, 2014 at 8:26pm — No Comments
At the DECOM WORLD conference this week on "Well Integrity" and WIMS, I asked the engineers: Why not add HSE metrics on your well dashboard to adjust for the (in)experience of the crew? It would serve as a kind of economic deflator; but you would have to quantify the skill level of the individuals or keep track of their "flight hours" as with pilots. I made copies available of the first page of my article on Macondo (the unmentionable ghost of which was in the subtext of most questions and…Continue
Added by George Baker on April 16, 2014 at 8:06pm — No Comments
Has anyone ever wondered about how it is that Transocean doesn't have a drilling contract in Mexico for deep and ultra-deep wells using its 6th generation semi-submersibles? Has anyone ever wondered how it is that a home-grown Mexican company, Grupo R, has three such semi's under contract with Pemex, despite no experience outside of Mexico or outside a Pemex contract?
In the course of preparing a report on the outlook for the implementation of the cross-border oil agreement that came…Continue
Added by George Baker on January 4, 2014 at 9:30pm — No Comments
What are your thoughts on having video on drilling rigs?
Do they change the safety culture?
Please comment only if you have experience with video.
Comments on it's what you breathe
I was in Nigeria for Camco, Now Shclumberger and was on a stimulation boat. We pumped a product supplied by Shell oil called EPO sand. I did not realize until later in life that it had damaged my liver. When I went to Nigeria, My cholesterol was below 200 I did not know what a triglyceride was. Now years later my cholesterol is 650 and my triglycerides are above 1700.
I have had one pancreatitis' attack and my prognosis is not good. I recently…Continue